Monday, June 17, 2013

Looking For 'A New Devil’:
Israeli Leaders & Supporters Scramble After Iran Election


Hassan Rouhani's unexpected victory in this weekend's Iranian election has sent Israeli hasbara into a tailspin. The desire for an Iranian bogeyman is so intense in the warmongering mainstream of Israeli and neoconservative discourse that any attempt to mask their pre-election desires and post-election frustration has been futile. Their entire game plan has been on display -- every Iranian leader is a New Hitler and every New Hitler must be stopped. The whole point is to stave off any possible reconciliation or even minor deflation of tensions between Iran and the West, namely the United States, so as to maintain permanent Israeli hegemony over the region and American largesse and diplomatic cover. A thaw after thirty-four years in the US-Iran standoff is scarier to Israeli leaders than all the unborn Palestinian babies under occupation. At least they're already under Israeli control; the Islamic Republic of Iran never has been.

Daniel Pipes, that loathsome Likudnik, is at least clear about his hopes for the Iranian future. It lies not in the aspirations of the Iranian people, but in the smoldering ruins of a joint US-Israeli airstrike. Without a cartoonish scapegoat like the one the Western media made out of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad through their mistranslations and misinformation, Iran might not look so bombable. So Pipes - and the rest of his despicable ilk - wished mightily for the conservative Saeed Jalili to win Friday's vote, or rather, using the well-established narrative, that Jalili would be selected as the winner by Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

A more moderate Iranian president, the neocons know, might signal a change in diplomatic dynamics and open the door to a less combative and punitive negotiating stance from the West. Rouhani, especially, with his history as a nuclear negotiator and Master's and doctorate degrees from a Scottish university, is an existential threat to well-worn Israeli propaganda of Iranian recalcitrance and obstinacy.

It was on Rouhani's watch that Iran voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment in 2003 and accepted intrusive inspections above and beyond what was legally required by its safeguards agreement for two years, during which the IAEA affirmed the peaceful nature of the program. It was only after Iran's European negotiating partners, at the behest of the Americans, reneged on their promise to offer substantive commitments and respect Iran's inalienable right to a domestic nuclear infrastructure that Iran resumed enrichment.

The turnout for the vote - a whopping 72%, forecast accurately by pre-election polling - signals another chink in the armor of conventional hasbara. Iranians, by and large, have faith that their voices matter and that change - or consistency - and progress can be achieved through the ballot box and by collective engagement within their nation's political environment. No, this doesn't mean, of course, that everyone who voted on Friday is a supporter of the Islamic Republic as it is constituted today. But it shows that the Iranian public is in no way looking to the skies for a savior in the form of an F-16 and is confident that change will only come from within Iran - by Iranians, for Iranians - not forced or foisted upon them by crippling sanctions or foreign troops.

Two days before the election, in an unprecedented and masterfully strategic move - Ayatollah Khamenei said in a speech, "My first recommendation is for an enthusiastic presence at the ballot box. It’s possible that an individual for some reason may not want to support the Islamic system, but he wants to support his country. Everyone must come out and vote."

He added, "A maximum turnout at the ballot box is more important than anything else for the country. And the nation with a powerful action on Friday will prove its firm relationship and connection with the Islamic system and will once again make the enemy unfulfilled and hopeless," concluding that, "No one knows the divine fate of the nation on Friday; however, the more votes the elected individual . . . receives, the more strength he has to stand against the nation’s enemy and defend the country’s interests."

The Iranian electorate didn't heed Khamenei's words. Rather, Khamenei merely gave voice to how most Iranians already felt. The Iranian political system, founded far more on resistance to foreign domination than on religious fundamentalism, is of great pride to most Iranians, regardless of their particular feelings about the legitimacy or potential longevity of a theocratic republic.

The massive turnout undermined Western prognostications of both Iranian disillusionment and disinterest; the election itself, the first one administered by a new, independent election committee, was proof that Iranians and Iran itself will continue to shirk the easy categorization and absurd stereotypes ubiquitous in our own media and politics. After all, the centrist Rouhani, a long-time member of the highest echelons of the Iranian establishment whose candidacy was backed by two former presidents, was the only cleric in the race.

As astute Iran analyst Farideh Farhi wrote before the election, based on the growing and energized interest gleaned from independent polling, "a good sector of the Iranian society is interested in a more differentiated understanding of Iran; an Iran in which its citizens are not mere tools of a despot's engineering."

Yet, the same day Iranians took to the polls, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon was in Washington D.C., delivering a speech at the AIPAC-affiliated Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Ha'aretz journalist Barak Ravid reported,
The head of the Israeli defense establishment declared - without any reservations - that nothing will change as a result of the Iranian election and that, in any event, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will decide on the country's next president. 
It did not take long for the depth of Ya'alon's embarrassment of himself, and of those on whose behalf he flew to Washington, became clear. At best, Ya'alon's remarks reflected a serious error in judgment on the part of Israeli intelligence and provided additional proof of the limitations of Military Intelligence and the Mossad in predicting internal political shifts in Iran and in Arab states. At worst, his words reflected arrogance, prejudice and shooting from the hip of the very worst kind. 
But how can we complain about Ya'alon, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in Poland on Wednesdsay that Iran's "so-called" election will not bring about any meaningful change. Netanyahu's and Ya'alon's Pavlovian responses, as well as the statement issued by the Foreign Ministry on Saturday night, reflect the overall approach of the Likud government which rejects all change, exaggerates the threats, plays down the opportunities and sanctifies the status quo. 
The only thing missing was for Netanyahu and Ya'alon to call for extending the term of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as in the case of Egypt and former President Hosni Mubarak.
Indeed, the Israeli response was swift and expected. After years of insisting the Iranian President could single-handedly authorize a second Holocaust, Israel's demagogue Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu moved quickly to keep the hysteria high. "Let us not delude ourselves,” he said in a press conference on Sunday. "The international community must not become caught up in wishes and be tempted to relax the pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear program." Netanyahu also noted that the Iranian president wields no real power in Iran, a concept unmentioned throughout the Ahmadinejad era. "It's the same Iran," an Israeli government statement read.

Meanwhile, International Relations Minister Yuval Steinitz told Army Radio on Sunday that, even though "the results are a credit to the Iranian people," there would be no "change" in the Iranian nuclear program. As such, he said, sanctions against Iran "must continue, regardless of the desire of the Iranian people for progress," since, after all, Iran is the new Nazi Germany and "only a year or less away from the nuclear red line." Of course, according to Israeli estimates, Iran has been only a year away from this mysterious "red line" for a decade now and Steinitz has recently deemed the potential of a nuclear-armed Iran to be "equal to 30 nuclear North Koreas," insisting that "if Iran gets the first few bombs, in a decade or so they will have 100 nuclear bombs."

Back in September 2005, just a month into Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's first term and before the new Iranian president uttered a mistranslated word about Israel and maps, Steinitz was making identical comments.

"Despite all the different circumstances, we see similarities to what happened in the 1930s, when people underestimated the real problem or focused on other dangers. For us, either the world will tackle Iran in advance or all of us will face the consequences," Steinitz, then-chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, said during a trip to Washington. "Threats of sanctions and isolation alone will not do it."

Indeed, for Israel, it's always "the same Iran."

Israeli politicians and pundits alike have been frustrated by Rouhani's victory. Deputy Defense Minister Gilad Erdan "feared Rowhani’s win, and his reputation as a centrist and reformer, might lead the West to give Iran more leeway in diplomatic contacts over its rogue nuclear drive," while Yedioth Ahronoth's diplomatic affairs reporter Itamar Eichner noted that Israel now worries it will have difficulty convincing the United States to support a military attack.

Not all Israelis, however, reacted the same way. Shimon Peres, for instance, welcomed the "good news."

Knesset minister Zahava Gal-on of Meretz issued a statement reading, "I extend my sympathy to the Israeli government that, with heavy heart and head hung low, must bid farewell to Ahmadinejad, who served as propaganda card and as an excellent source of excuses to avoid dealing with Israel’s real problems."

“Where will the prime minister turn to now, when someone asks him about the Palestinian conflict?," she wondered. "What about the out-of-control budget deficit for which he was responsible?… What about the racism that exists within Israeli society?… What will he do?"

Gal-on's statement added, "I fear that the election of the moderate Rowhani is not just a blow to the extremists in Tehran, but also to the extremist leadership in Israel, which will now have to replace intimidation with actions."

Similarly, following the official election results, Yedioth commentator Yigal Sarna penned a piece entitled, "A New Devil," in which he satirically lamented, "Oh Hassan Rouhani, you moderate, who invited you? What did you have to come for? What are we going to do without the scarecrow, the fanatic Ahmadinejad?" He continued,
What will we do without our Persian Hitler? What will Bibi draw at the UN? At whom will (Defense Minister Yaalon) storm and to whom will he send our smart bombs and how will Bibi distract people from the plundering here? How will we continue to talk about being the 'villa in the jungle' when the villa is filled with jungle and the jungle is filled with protest? What are we going to wave away when Danny Danons shake off every peace plan and lead us to international isolation?
"We need to return to the reality and quickly find a new devil," Sarna concluded.

And we will. Because we need to.

In fact, AIPAC operatives and acolytes, regime change enthusiasts, Beltway hacks, and Israeli commentators have wasted no time at all.

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Originally posted at Mondoweiss.

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Sunday, June 16, 2013

#IranElection: Wide Asleep in America's Twitter Coverage























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Friday, June 14, 2013

An Interview with Hooman Majd:
Part 2: It’s the Economy & Threats Stupid!

(Photo Credit: GQ / Ken Browar)

Hooman Majd is the grandson of an ayatollah, son of a career diplomat, and related by marriage to former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami. Born in Tehran, he spent his formative years globe-trotting for his father’s work and was educated in schools in San Francisco, New Delhi, Tunis, London and Washington D.C.

After many years in the entertainment business, heading Island Records and producing at Palm Pictures, Majd visited Iran in 2003, the first time he had been back to his birthplace in over thirty years. Over the past decade, he has traveled to Iran often and been a consistently astute and articulate observer of Iranian society and politics.

Author of the best-selling books, “The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran” (2008) and “The Ayatollah’s Democracy: An Iranian Challenge” (2010) and countless articles published in Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, The New Yorker, Newsweek, The New Republic, The Financial Times, Foreign Policy, Politico, The New York Observer, The Daily Beast, Salon and elsewhere, Majd’s intellect, insight and humility are refreshing, especially in a community occupied by self-declared “experts” and agenda-driven analysts and activists.

Majd recently spent a year living in Iran researching his newest book, “The Ministry of Guidance Invites You to Not Stay: An American Family in Iran,” which will be published this Fall.

Muftah met up with Majd in Brooklyn recently, where he generously lent his time to answer a wide range of questions. Below is an excerpt of the conversation, which focused on the Iranian economy and the effects of sanctions, the legacy of the Iranian revolution, and the future of Iran-U.S. relations.


*****

MUFTAH: In your year living in Tehran, did you get a chance to talk to strangers and what did you come away with in terms of your understanding of what matters to people on a daily basis? On the economy? On Iran’s standing in the international community? Is this something that you see weighing on average people?

HM: No, I don’t think people think about it too much. It doesn’t seem to be a primary concern. I think the economy is something people are constantly complaining about and constantly worrying about and that’s only natural when you have a country that is basically under siege from sanctions and has been for a very long time and that affects everything. Economically it affects everything. Not to the extent that we sometimes imagine, I mean, people aren’t starving. They are managing, but it does affect inflation and all the other things.

So the economy is definitely something that seems to be, at least in my experience, a number one priority for people. Fixing the economy, creating jobs. There’s a certain hopelessness, and I think that’s partly because of the poor economy, among certain elements of the youth who feel like they spent all this time studying and going to school and graduating and then, because there aren’t any jobs, going on to get a Master’s Degree and there’s still no jobs and they go on to get a PhD and there is still no work and that’s very much related to the economy. So that seems to be a big thing.

But I think very few people talk about the nuclear issue as an issue that is of daily concern to them, or even weekly or monthly concern to them, not in the way that it is here. Even the potential confrontation with the West doesn’t appear to be something that’s a very high priority for people.

Corruption in the government, resentment of the tremendous amount of wealth that’s on display these days in Tehran. One of the things you notice now versus even five or six or seven years ago is that people are very comfortable showing off their wealth. Ten years ago, even if they were very wealthy, people chose not to drive Porsches and ridiculous cars and have ostentatious homes that were visible from the street.

MUFTAH: What do you think accounts for this change?

HM: I don’t think people care any more. People who are wealthy are benefiting from the system. However they gained their wealth and a large number of them gained it through connections, much like it was during the Shah’s time, they’re succeeding within that system and I think there’s a sense of power that comes with that that goes, “I just don’t care.” It doesn’t mean, however, that they’re necessarily supporters of the system or the regime or the government,

Before, you had to be a revolutionary. You had to show yourself as a revolutionary and a revolutionary doesn’t drive a Mercedes. A revolutionary drives a Kia!

As far as I’m concerned, that’s a little bit of a danger for the Islamic Republic because part of its credibility was that there was going to be social justice. If you’re in Tajrish [an area in a more affluent part of Tehran] and you see a homeless kid sitting on the corner, begging, while cars driving around the traffic circle are Porsches and Mercedes and BMWs, it’s a reality you wouldn’t have seen in the Islamic Republic only a few years before. Even if people had the money, they didn’t want to show it. Now it seems that they don’t care. That’s a generalization, but it’s based on my experience.

MUFTAH: The phenomenon of display, a sense of almost exhibitionist individualism, whether it’s through personal style or wealth, is very noticeable in Tehran. Especially in upper and middle-class neighborhoods such as Gisha, for example. Are there a particular socioeconomic dimension to this type of behavior?

HM: For people who are wealthy and cosmopolitan or, I hate to use the word secular or Westernized, but for the sake of this conversation, let’s say more Westernized in many ways, for them there’s not much else they can do. It’s hard to go to a restaurant in Tehran, there are some good ones, but there aren’t that many of them and it’s hard to do anything other than to entertain at home, privately. So you’re going to start spending your money. I mean, Tehran traffic is awful, if you can navigate it in a Porsche, that’s nicer, and a bit more fun.

I know a few very, very wealthy people in Iran and over the years they’ve had less and less of a problem with displaying their wealth. And I’ve actually said to a couple of them, ‘This is what happened during the Shah’s time.’ I’m a little bit older than some of them and I remember.

This goes back to that whole argument about regime change, which we hear about all the time here in America. Not about whether America should try because, I think, everyone pretty much agrees that America can’t bring about regime change in Iran or even help bring it about.

It goes back to something that’s going to be internal. Whatever happens to this regime, whether it stays and reforms, or whether eventually there is a revolution – which I myself doubt since I think Iranians don’t really want a revolution and the unknown that goes with that – Iranians seem to want change.

Thursday, June 13, 2013

AMAZEBALLS: Rachel Maddow's Ignorance on Iran


MSNBC host Rachel Maddow has a penchant for saying smug, self-satisfied and generally stupid things about Iran. She has claimed that the Iranian Revolution in 1979 marked the establishment of a dictatorship in that country, rather than end of one; one that just so happened to be a monarchic dynasty that was proudly supported for decades by the United States government. Just two months ago, she weirdly decided to mock Iranians for their national and religious holidays because, y'know, she's progressive like that.

Maddow was back at it this week, ending her nightly program on Monday with some juvenile comments about Friday's presidential vote, when Iranians will elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's successor. Here's how she began:
The current president of Iran has had the job for the last eight years. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he's known around the world for defending Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.
It took her all of seven whole seconds to spit out that egregious falsehood.

First, Maddow's premise is wrong. Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons. Despite being the single most spied on country on the planet, U.S. intelligence consistently affirms that Iran has no nuclear weapons program and its leadership has not made any decision to start one. Iran has never breached its obligations as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The vast majority of allegations about Iranian weaponization research and testing has been provided by the United States and Israel, has never been authenticated, and refers to long-debunked claims about supposed actions that took place over a decade ago.

Iran does have, however, a highly-developed nuclear energy program and enriches uranium to levels far below weapons-grade under strict supervision and routine inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The agency has continued to verify - up to four times a year over the past ten years - that Iran has never diverted any nuclear material for military purposes and has also affirmed "it has all the means it needs to make sure that does not happen with Iran's enriched uranium, including cameras, physical inspections and seals on certain materials and components."

Furthermore, despite the constant mainstream perception that Iran's nuclear facilities are opaque and mysterious, the fact is that the IAEA has conducted more inspections in Iran than anywhere else.

Former Iranian nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian, now a lecturer at Princeton University, has noted, "Since 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has implemented the most robust inspections in its history with more than 100 unannounced and over 4000 man-day inspections in Iran."

Just last year alone, IAEA investigators spent 1,356 calendar days in Iran, conducting 215 on-site inspections of the country's 16 declared nuclear facilities, and spending more than 12% of the agency's entire $127.8 million budget on intrusively monitoring the Iranian program, which fields only a single functional nuclear reactor, which doesn't even operate at full capacity.

By contrast, IAEA inspectors spent only "180 calendar days in France, Europe’s biggest nuclear power," while "Russia and the U.S., which maintain the world’s biggest atomic-weapon arsenals and aren’t required under rules to allow inspections of all facilities, received 16 and 50 calendar-day visits respectively."

But Maddow's ignorance was even more pronounced when she claimed that Ahmadinejad is known for "defending" a program that doesn't exist.

Never once, in the 34 years since the revolution, has a single government official stated Iran's intention to acquire nuclear weapons - to the contrary, such a goal has always been explicitly denied on strategic, legal, moral, humanitarian and religious grounds.

Ahmadinejad himself has never strayed from this stance. In September 2005, shortly after his first inauguration, the Iranian president stood before the United Nations General Assembly and reaffirmed the Islamic Republic's "previously and repeatedly declared position that, in accordance with our religious principles, pursuit of nuclear weapons is prohibited."

The following year, he stated clearly, "Nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defense doctrine and Iran is not a threat to any country." Indeed, over the past eight years, Ahmadinejad has lambasted the development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons as "inhuman," "against the whole grain of humanity," "obsolete," "abhorrent," "disgusting and shameful." Ahmadinejad has said, "The nuclear bomb is the worst inhumane weapon," described it as "evil," and declared anyone who builds an atomic bomb as "crazy and insane," as well as "politically...backward."

Nevertheless, American officials and their ventriloquist media puppets like Rachel Maddow continue to claim that Iran is actively pursuing the development of nuclear arms. On June 9, the New York Times stated that one of the most pressing issues for Samantha Power, Obama's nominee to replace Susan Rice as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, will be to confront "Iran's apparent attempts to develop a nuclear weapon."

The very same day, in an interview with the American overseas propaganda outfit, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman expressed, "from a U.S. perspective," the belief that "Iran's nuclear program...is headed towards having a nuclear weapon."

Apparently, the "U.S. perspective," noted by Sherman doesn't rely on facts or evidence.

Some officials, however, choose their words more carefully than others.  During testimony before Congress on June 11, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "Iran is a threat to US national security in many ways, not simply their move toward the potential to develop a nuclear weapon," adding, "I choose my words carefully, because the intelligence community has not yet come to a conclusion that they intend to build a nuclear weapon."

Yet Maddow's own declaration was even more definitive, echoing, of all things, the words of George W. Bush. In March 2008, Bush, while speaking on RFE/RL's Persian-language counterpart, Radio Farda, stated that the Iranian government have "declared they want to have a nuclear weapon to destroy people -- some in the Middle East."

This statement was so devoid of truth that even former State Department Iran specialist Suzanne Maloney was moved to speak out. Maloney, a fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center, noted at the time, “The Iranian government is on the record across the board as saying it does not want a nuclear weapon,” adding that while, in her opinion, “there's plenty of room for skepticism about these assertions…it's troubling for the administration to indicate that Iran is explicitly embracing the program as a means of destroying another country."

Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, a non-proliferation group, also chimed in to correct the record. Calling Bush's statement "uninformed," he explained, "Iran has never said it wanted a nuclear weapon for any reason. It's just not true. It's a little troubling that the president and the leading Republican candidate are both so wrong about Iran."

It is indisputable that Iranian officials have consistently denounced the acquisition, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons.

Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski made this point in 2009, stating that Iran has been "publicly affirming for quite some time" three main points: "We don't want nuclear weapons. We're not seeking nuclear weapons. Our religion forbids us to have nuclear weapons."

Brzeneski added, "Note, incidentally, that this stands in sharp, explicit contrast with the position of the North Koreans. The North Koreans have been saying the very opposite: 'We want nuclear weapons. We're seeking nuclear weapons. And, in your face, haha!, we have nuclear weapons.'" Brzenzinski also condemned the American penchant for "oversimplification and sloganeering rather than analysis" with regards to Iran.

Early this year, Greg Thielmann, a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, similarly affirmed that the "leadership in Tehran continues to challenge the rationale and morality of nuclear weapons. Although such policy statements are hardly determinative of actual intentions, they do stand in stark contrast to the declaratory policies of other governments of proliferation concern, such as North Korea or Pakistan."

Unsurprisingly, the rest of Maddow's segment, solely designed to make fun of Iran for some reason, was rife with worn out stereotypes and mainstream talking points.  Even the minutiae of her snide derision were weird.  Referring to the current heated presidential race as "amazeballs" - because, y'know, she's a professional journalist - Maddow found it ridiculous that the three presidential debates, broadcast live on Iranian television, each exceeded four hours.  Four hours!, she scoffed. Of course, American debates between only two candidates last roughly two hours. Iran had eight candidates. Quadruple the contenders, double the time. How absolutely insane.

Also, towards the end of her bit, Maddow claimed that Ahmadinejad was recently in a helicopter crash, when - based on the article her own staff shows onscreen - it was an emergency landing due to unspecified technical problems. The article itself states clearly that "the pilot managed to land the aircraft safely."

Still, Maddow repeats the word "crash" four times in less than thirty seconds and speculates that the reason the helicopter landed hastily was due to foul play. Her evidence?  The media put the word "accident" in between quotation marks when reporting on the story.  Here's how she put it, using her most ironic voice:
"The media reports on the Ahmadinejad helicopter crash put air-quotes around the word accident, as in 'President Ahmadinejad just survived a helicopter crash. It's reported to have been an accident, nudge nudge, wink wink, yeah right'."
Ok, first, print media can't put "air-quotes" around anything, Rachel.  They're actual quotes.

Second, the reason the media put the word accident in quotes is because...wait for it...the reports were quoting from the primary source of the news.  And what was that primary source that called the incident an accident?  Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's official website.

But, for Maddow and her inept interns, "The media apparently thinks he was set up."  No, the media stated the emergency landing was due to an "accident," because that's what the president's press release said.

But when it comes to Iran, the liberal media darling Maddow is no different than the neoconservative editors of the Washington Post.  Facts are irrelevant and propaganda prevails.

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Peter Hart of Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) has also posted about Maddow's promotion of misinformation.

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Wednesday, June 12, 2013

An Interview with Hooman Majd:
Part 1: The Presidential Election

(Photo Credit: House of Majd)

Hooman Majd is the grandson of an ayatollah, son of a career diplomat, and related by marriage to former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami. Born in Tehran, he spent his formative years globe-trotting for his father’s work and was educated in schools in San Francisco, New Delhi, Tunis, London and Washington D.C.

After many years in the entertainment business, heading Island Records and producing at Palm Pictures, Majd visited Iran in 2003, the first time he had been back to his birthplace in over thirty years. Over the past decade, he has traveled to Iran often and been a consistently astute and articulate observer of Iranian society and politics.

Author of the best-selling books, “The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran” (2008) and “The Ayatollah’s Democracy: An Iranian Challenge” (2010) and countless articles published in Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, The New Yorker, Newsweek, The New Republic, The Financial Times, Foreign Policy, Politico, The New York Observer, The Daily Beast, Salon and elsewhere, Majd’s intellect, insight and humility are refreshing, especially in a community occupied by self-declared “experts” and agenda-driven analysts and activists.

Majd recently spent a year living in Iran researching his newest book, “The Ministry of Guidance Invites You to Not Stay: An American Family in Iran,” which will be published this Fall.

Muftah met up with Majd in Brooklyn recently, where he generously lent his time to answer a wide range of questions. Below is an excerpt of the conversation, which focused on the upcoming presidential election in Iran.


*****

MUFTAH: On Friday June 14, Iranians will once again go to the polls to vote for their next president. Unsurprisingly, Western governments and media routinely cast Iranian elections as unfree and unfair, if not always because of claims of fraud, then because of the vetting proces for eligible candidates, which is conducted by the Guardian Council, an appointed body mandated by the Iranian Constitution. What are your thoughts on this?

HOOMAN MAJD (HM): I love all the comments about the Guardian Council this and the Guardian Council that. Yes, I think it’s horrific what the Guardian Council does and I think it’s really unfair, but let’s be reasonable: what country is going to have 686 people go on the ballot to run for president? It’s not physically possible for someone to go into a polling booth on election and chose between 686 candidates. What television network can arrange a debate between – forget about 686 – even thirty candidates?

Our media in America winnows those down to two because they decide who’s viable and vetted. Just ask Ralph Nader! Or Dennis Kucinich, who was a Congressman and couldn’t even get on a debate. So once you can’t get on the debates, that means you’re not a viable candidate. So who’s decided all this? First, you have the Democratic National Committee, then you have the Republican National Committee. Then there’s the media and corporate donors.

I’m not saying that Iran is as democratic as the United States. Certainly not. And there are arbitrary rejections of candidates which shouldn’t happen and the Guardian Council, in my view, shouldn’t be a body that vets candidates. I think there should be a rule of law, there should be very specific requirements for the presidency, as there are in every country in the world, for any leadership role. And as long as you qualify, you should be approved. There shouldn’t be a political consideration. So yes, I would agree with that.

But to paint this picture that Iranian government is automatically undemocratic because not everybody can run, well that’s true in most countries, not everybody can run.

MUFTAH: Do you think the approved candidates for the Iranian presidency offer the Iranian people an actual choice, a real choice of candidates with differing policies and a range of platforms for dealing with internal, as well as international, issues. If so, who among them might be able to offer substantive change?

HM: I don’t think that there’s any doubt that there’s a real choice, despite the disqualifications of [Ahmadinejad aide Esfandiar Rahim] Mashaei and [former president Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani. Hassan Rouhani, for example, is a substantially different person than Saeed Jalili who is also substantially different from Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Ali Velayati. Right now, with the eight candidates, it appears that there is a choice.

Sure, it’s heavily weighted on the conservative side, but there is one genuine reformist, Mohammad Reza Aref, who is unlikely to gain much support only because he is kind of like [Khatami advisor and reformist presidential candidate Mohammad] Moeen [was in 2005], kind of unknown and doesn’t have charisma. Unless [former president Mohammad] Khatami and the other reformists throw their support behind him, it’s unlikely that he will gain any traction with the voting public. So it’s really a question of whether Rouhani will get that from the Rafsanjani camp and from the Khatami camp. [UPDATE: Early on Tuesday June 11, four days before the election, Khatami's Advisory Council announced its endorsement of Rouhani as the reformist candidate.]

A Rouhani presidency is a substantially different presidency than a Jalili presidency. I’m not predicting anything, but I think certainly an Iranian voter could say, “I think that’s going to make a difference in my life. If Saeed Jalili is president or if Hassan Rouhani is president.” It’s going to make a difference in foreign policy, I’m convinced of that. It’s probably going to make a difference in the economy to a large degree. And then you bring Ghalibaf, Tehran’s mayor, into it; he managed this impossible-to-manage city quite well for the last eight years and has hired technocrats, good people, not ideologically based appointments.

Then I look at Jalili and I think, “The guy’s an ideologue.” He’s a technocrat, sure, but he’s an ideologue, especially when you look at his history in the foreign ministry. His dissertation was on the foreign policy of the prophet. There’s nothing wrong with that by the way – people make fun of it and I don’t think it’s fair to make fun of it, because unlike Jesus, Mohammad did have a foreign policy – so if he had a foreign policy, why not do a dissertation on it? But it shows his ideology.

MUFTAH: And both Rouhani and Jalili are nuclear negotiators, so they each have a history of negotiating with the West.

HM: Yes, and I would argue that Rouhani was much more successful in his negotiations.

MUFTAH: So would he.

HM: Yes, so would he. Now, Rouhani is not a particularly charismatic person either. But he’s very close to Hashemi [Rafsanjani] and he runs the Center for Strategic Studies, which is a Hashemi think tank. I don’t know how close he is to the Supreme Leader. The question that a lot of people who follow Iran is whether the elections will be engineered. I don’t mean in terms of fraud, I mean in terms of being engineered to get the favorite candidates to be in a position to win.

In 2005, and I was in Iran at the time, it was pretty obvious that the engineering in the first round was for Ghalibaf until ten days before the election and then it switched to Ahmadinejad. And Ahmadinejad received the support of the institutions, the establishment, which just made him shoot over the others in terms of coming in second to Rafsanjani. And then he legitimately beat him in the second round. And he didn’t need the establishment to win in the second round, he would have won anyway.

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

On Non-Resident Voting in the Iranian Election


This Friday, June 14, 2013, millions will head to the polls to vote for the next president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the vast majority of votes will naturally come from voters inside Iran itself, many will also come from outside its borders as any documented Iranian citizen worldwide is eligible to cast a ballot in the race.

Last week, Hassan Qashqavi, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Consular, Parliamentary and Expatriates' Affairs and who also heads the Supervisory Body Overseeing Iran's Presidential Election Abroad, said, "The Iranian presidential election abroad will be held at 280 ballot stations in 120 countries on five continents concurrent with Iran."

According to official results, in the last presidential election in 2009, 234,812 votes were cast in countries outside Iran. In New York City, nearly 17,000 votes were cast, while in London, the number topped 10,000.

But just because Iranian citizens who don't live in Iran can legally vote, does that mean they should choose to exercise that right?

This question, along with some others, was posed to a number of writers, commentators, academics and friends of Iranian heritage.

Here are some of the questions, or variations thereof, that I posed:
Do you think that, beyond having the legal right, Iranians and Iranian citizens living outside Iran have the moral right to vote in Friday's presidential election despite not living in Iran?
If it is the obligation of Iranians living in Iran, and them alone, to chose the government under which they will live, whether they seek to challenge and change the system or to reinforce it, what role do Iranians abroad - some of whom have vastly different political and religious beliefs than Iranians in Iran - have in the vote?
Can "ex-patriot" voting be seen as a kind of foreign intervention for regime change (or reform), albeit a peaceful kind, or - conversely - could the act of voting itself be seen as legitimating a political system one may disagree with?
Are the circumstances different for Iranian citizens who have never visited Iran, never lived in Iran or who, perhaps, don't ever plan on going/returning?
Iranians are not monolithic. Like any large community of human beings the world over, Iranians and Iranian citizens, living in Iran or abroad, have diverse opinions on religion to politics to family and everything in between. Just like here in the United States, or any other country for that matter, there are those who support the government, and those who oppose it; those who thinking voting is important, those who consider it merely symbolic, and others who find it pointless, or worse.

Needless to say, the question of non-resident voting in general is certainly not unique to Iran; any national group with a diaspora could grapple with it.

The questions presented above are purposely broad, and not meant to be pointed or leading. They are supposed to be open-ended and thought-provoking, not presumptuous or limiting. They are not my own conclusions nor do they reflect my personal opinions. They are questions, only that, and if they read poorly or are misleading, the responsibility for their clunkiness is mine and mine alone.

Below are the generous responses I received from those I contacted. They are uniform only in their thoughtfulness, insight, and candidness. They reflect a diversity of opinion and consideration. Some are direct and concise, others extensive and multifaceted.

The contributors, so far, are:

Muhammad Sahimiprofessor, USC; editor of IMENews.com
Jasmin Ramsey, journalist and editor, LobeLog
Hooman Majd, journalist and author
Farideh Farhi, scholar and affiliate graduate faculty, University of Hawaii
Holly DagresMiddle East analyst and commentator; researcher at The Cairo Review
Reza Marashi, Research Director, National Iranian American Council (NIAC)
Farrah Joon, blogger, Sex and Fessenjoon
Arash Karami, Iran Pulse, Al Monitor
Saaghi Joon, blogger, Sex and Fessenjoon
Daniel Tavana, Research Associate, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)
Roshanak Taghavi, international journalist
Shirin Sadeghi, international journalist
Alex Shams, Co-Editor-in-Chief, Ajam Media Collective
Eskandar Sadeghi-BoroujerdiPhD student, Queen's College, University of Oxford
Mehrnaz Shahabi, anti-war activist and independent researcher

All opinions expressed below are solely those of the authors themselves and in no way represent the organizations or affiliations identified.

I will update the post if and when I receive more.

For readers wishing to voice their own opinions on this matter, feel free to do so in the comments. But please, keep it civil.
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Muhammad Sahimi
Professor, University of Southern California; editor of Iran News and Middle East Reports

I do not believe that there is any problem with expatriates voting in a national election in Iran. That would just indicate that they care about what happens in their homeland. I do not believe that their voting violates the principle, which I believe in, that it is Iranians living in Iran who must decide what to do with the government, because, after all, the expatriates would be voting for someone who lives and works in Iran, and has risen in politics, to the extent that he/she wants to run for high office.

Jasmin Ramsey
Journalist and editor, LobeLog

The Iranian government also grants the children of Iranian-born parents Iranian passports upon request and requires military service from males upon entering Iran even if they're only visiting for a short period of time and have never been to Iran before (though this can be avoided in most cases through bribery). I'm not sure how this can be construed as "foreign intervention for regime change" as suggested in the question if the mechanisms for this kind of voting have been put in place by the Iranian government itself, which considers itself a republic.

Voting implies you care about what happens inside your country enough to do something about it (even if you're not there), though deciding not to vote can also be a political action, no matter how ineffective and/or counterproductive that could be. If the Iranian government allows Iranian citizens who don't live in Iran to vote then I commend that action as much as I would any step taken by them that brings their elections closer to becoming free and fair.

Hooman Majd
Journalist and author

You know, that’s a very good question, one that I ponder all the time. I've always maintained that someone like myself - who has made the choice to be American and live in America - doesn't have the right to tell Iranians how they should live, or what kind of government they should have. We in the States get offended - even the most progressive among us - when, say, the French tell us what an ass our president is, or how bad our democracy is, or how imperialist we are. That’s a little different, I grant you, because someone like me holds dual citizenship.

I really think what would be entirely moral and fair would be for the Iranian government to allow any Iranian living anywhere to vote, as long as he or she paid taxes in Iran. Paying taxes is one reason I think it’s fair for expat Americans to have voice (beyond the fact that unlike Iranian expats, most Americans do intend to return home at some point, and don’t usually take the citizenship of the country they live in). At any rate, since we Iranians don’t like taxes, not even inside Iran, that would probably mean a zero participation rate in the elections outside Iran. So you see, I struggle with the question myself. But I will endeavor to vote this time, too.

I would add that those Iranians who are for wholesale regime change don’t really vote, so it probably means that those who do abroad reflect that strata of society in Iran that is likely to vote for a reformist, or pragmatist. So be it.

Farideh Farhi
Independent Scholar and Affiliate Graduate Faculty, University of Hawaii - Manoa

I personally cannot and do not choose to look at the question of voting in moralistic terms. The bottom line is that Iranian laws allow anyone who has an Iranian birth certificate and passport to vote - or not vote - anywhere in the world and they can if they have access to a voting center (I for instance do not in Hawaii). This is a reflection of Iran's acceptance or comfort with the idea of dual nationality. And I accept that comfort both as a privilege and obligation. The only thing I object to is that Iran's acceptance of nationality - both in pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary times - is patrilineal and only extends to children of an Iranian mother if the father is also Iranian. Last year, a law was passed to change this but not in categorical way (only on a case by case basis).

As to the nature of expat voting, I cannot speak on the basis of data but my personal observations suggest that those who hope for regime change generally see voting as a legitimation mechanism and hence approach any kind of voting in the Islamic republic with disdain. Those who consider voting, on the other hand, are very much influenced by trends inside the country. So there was much interest in voting in in 2009 outside of Iran and today there is much debate about whether to vote or not and which candidate to vote for in the same way there is a debate inside Iran.

On the last question, I cannot speak to circumstances that impact voting or non-voting behavior. I can, however, hypothesize that those who have never visited Islamic Iran or as you say are delinked from the country for whatever reason are less likely to be engaged with Iranian politics at the micro level.

Holly Dagres
Middle East analyst and commentator; researcher at The Cairo Review

I think the beauty of the electoral process is that a person is free to vote if he or she chooses, there is no morality involved only a sense of it being a "right". Having that been said, Iranians who live abroad are a grand variety that not only consist of the Diaspora, but also Iranians who have vast ties to Iran and continue to live between two countries, if not more. Therefore, just because they are an expat of sorts does not take away their right to vote, it just adds a special touch -- most often by voting for a reformist candidate -- someone who share ideas most in common with Western views they are acquainted with. Nevertheless, Iranians abroad do not have that much of an impact on voting and it would be rather naive to view it as foreign intervention or even regime change because at the end of the day, these people are voting for the very candidates accepted by the Velayat-e Faqih. When it comes to the Diaspora, I would assume they do not have any ties with Iran and therefore probably no interest whatsoever in the voting process or the Islamic regime for that matter.

Reza Marashi
Research Director, National Iranian American Council (NIAC)

It's a double-edged sword. If you would've asked me this question in 2009 or prior, I would've said that Iranian Americans should consider voting, because it was tantamount to taking advantage of one of the most obvious tools they have at our disposal to help hold the Iranian government accountable and move the country in an overall better direction. It's never a moral responsibility to vote, but I would've argued that voting was an important step toward Iranian Americans being recognized as a substantial constituency, increasing their political clout in Tehran, and refuting the philosophy that a government's power does not come from the people. Some Iranian Americans still feel this way. Others do not. I don't fault either point of view.

Of course, the flip side to this -- perhaps even more poignant after the events of 2009 -- is that boycotting an election is a very powerful message that citizens and a diaspora can send. However, it's only after Iranian Americans start voting that they can engage in symbolic boycotts of elections in protest. Because Iranian Americans have never had a truly large voting presence in Iranian elections, a boycott on their part would be mostly symbolic. And perhaps most importantly, for the time being at least, the Iranian government views Iranian Americans less as citizens with voting power equal to Iranians inside Iran, and more as a dependable source of money and education that can occasionally be utilized inside Iran.

Farrah
Blogger, Sex and Fessenjoon

I think that policies put forth by the Iranian regime affect all Iranian citizens - regardless of their physical location. All Iranian citizens have the moral right to vote - just as US citizens have the right to vote even if they live in a different country. Because no matter what their location is, they still feel the burden of the country's laws especially if they have family, money, property, etc. in Iran.

I don't believe that expats or non-residents with different religious/political preference should have their vote taken away because their voice still resonates among Iranians within Iran - whether they are Muslim or not, Jewish or not, reformist or not. I think that it's very bold to assume that my political beliefs aren't supported anywhere within Iran... and vice versa. And if that's a reason for people to not vote - then why do we allow political parties in other countries? I believe it is absolutely crucial for every voice to be represented in a vote.

If you're asking whether I think it's WORTH voting in the Iranian election, well that's a different story...

Arash Karami
Writer on Iranian affairs; currently with Iran Pulse, Al-Monitor

These are difficult questions; there are some issues here that the Iranian ex-patriot community has been dealing with for three decades. One thing that is unanimous is that most Iranians outside the country care deeply both for Iran and Iranians (there are plenty of surveys to prove this). Some people don't believe in voting in Iranian elections because of what happened in 2009 or their general opposition to the government. Others think that there are some candidates that are better than others and can improve the lives of people living inside Iran, particularly on the economic front where most of the president's powers reside.

And part of it is self-interest too. For the expat community, Ahmadinejad's rhetoric was generally considered embarrassing and shameful. Between the seven candidates, there is a difference on certain specific issues and I don't begrudge anyone that wants to vote; it's their right and if they can help play an instrumental role in improving the lives of Iranians domestically, then one could argue that logically they should, even if they don't plan on ever going back. (My guess is that if Iran ever opens up, most expats will visit often, but most will never go back. Iran, especially Tehran and other major cities, have changed so much, most don't even know what it is they would be going back to.)

On the question of regime change as far as voting is concerned, the act of voting will not change the regime, which is precisely why some expats will never vote.

Saaghi
Blogger, Sex and Fessenjoon

Do I believe Iranians abroad have a legal right to vote? Absolutely.

A moral one? Not at all.

Unless an Iranian living abroad has spent a significant time in Iran, there is not much value in their perspective. Many of us born and raised abroad have grown familiar with our heritage and culture by making frequent visits to our motherland. This, by no means, translates into understanding the vast impact government policies and sanctions have on day-to-day life. If a vote is a tally-mark for change, how can I know what change is the right one? I would not vote in France's election, despite having traveled their many times-- and I don't believe I'm entitled to voting in Iran's election, despite my emotional or familial ties.

At the end of the day, an 'educated vote' is rare -- and I can read news articles all day, but my vote would be based on my biased firsthand experience of living in America, and rendezvousing Tehran during the Summer. I believe in aiding the Iranian people and my family in Iran in helping bring about the change they want by standing in solidarity with them, and that is silent, unconditional solidarity.

Daniel Tavana
Research Associate, Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)

This might be a boring response, but I have two different answers. First, there is an important difference between Iranians and Iranian citizens. The latter have a constitutionally protected right to vote, whereas the former do not (unless they are eligible for Iranian citizenship and the state views them as citizens in accordance with the law). There are a number of Iranians living abroad who are citizens, and these people should be able to vote if they so chose, even if they live abroad. Many of them are students, family members, tourists, etc. who are Iranian citizens but cannot vote in-country. Diaspora Iranians, "ex-patriot" as you describe, do not have the right to vote in accordance with the constitution. Diaspora Iranians (non-citizens) can participate however they so choose: encouraging citizens to vote a certain way is not, in my opinion, a form of intervention or regime change. I don't think governments should ever systematically do that, for obvious reasons, but I do not see the harm in private citizens, be they of Iranian descent or not, express an opinion about a country they care about. The fact that these individuals might "have vastly different political and religious beliefs" (an assertion I don't even think can be empirically proven), is inconsequential. It is ultimately for the Iranian people, Iranian citizens, to decide what they want.

As for your question on morality, I'm not sure what you mean the "moral right to vote." I think the right to vote is a constitutionally protected one reserved for citizens of the state, who may choose to vote or not vote as they see fit. I, myself, am not an advocate of boycotts -- I think they consistently fail to accomplish the goals of those who advocate in their favor. But I think that's an entirely separate question.

Roshanak Taghavi
International journalist

Fundamentally, I don't see it as a question of morality. Citizens have a basic, legal right to vote—even those who have neither visited Iran nor lived there, or don’t plan to return. [Just as I— as a US citizen—had the right to cast an absentee ballot from Iran (where I was working as a reporter) during the 2008 U.S. presidential election. Even if I’d stayed overseas, I would still have had the right to vote as an absentee in the 2012 U.S. election, just like tons of other expats]. "Ex-patriot" voting is not “foreign intervention,” because those voting are citizens of Iran and may still consider it their country, no matter where they live.

For many of those in the diaspora, the ‘Iran’ of today may no longer be the ‘Iran’ they left (the country has changed so much both culturally and politically throughout the last thirty-plus years, and is still constantly changing) – but who they are today has, to some degree, been shaped by their Iranian heritage. If someone holds Iranian citizenship, and cares enough to keep it, he or she has the right to vote.

Yes, the act of voting itself may indeed be viewed as legitimizing a political system one may disagree with. But those same voters who might not necessarily like that political system could also view voting as a tool to instigate organic reform, however slow it might turn out to be.

Shirin Sadeghi
International journalist

The role Iranians abroad have in the election is that they have the right to vote: Overseas Iranians can vote from abroad if they have an Iranian birth certificate and passport. While the current citizenship requirements unfortunately exclude some Iranians (for example those whose mother is Iranian are usually excluded because they don't meet the patrilineal requirements), it does add to the numbers of voters (which is a good thing in any country), particularly because of the large numbers of Iranians in the diaspora at the moment.

There are many nations that envy this Iranian allowance -- Pakistan, for instance, only recently passed a law allowing overseas Pakistanis to vote and that won't even take effect until the next election.

As for a moral obligation, this doesn't really seem like a question of morality. For any system of government there are those who accept the system and are willing to work within it, those who do not accept it and refuse to acknowledge its legitimacy by participating in elections, and yet others who don't see their vote as bringing any kind of meaningful change. The fact is, some of the most passionate and well informed people refuse to vote in many countries around the world -- that's how they choose to exercise that right. Think of it this way: In the US, people have the right to bear arms, but not everyone does -- those who don't aren't lacking in morality.

Alex Shams
Co-Editor-in-Chief, Ajam Media Collective

As Iranians abroad, our status is defined by displacement from our homeland. Some imagine themselves in exile, unable to return. Others imagine themselves as a diaspora, able to return but unwilling due to opportunities abroad unavailable back home. But either way, we are all Iranian; the Iranian political process shapes both our lives as well as those of our friends and family in Iran.

Additionally, the Iranian political process has a tremendous affect on our status and our lives as Iranians abroad. As the US, the EU, and other international actors attempt to isolate Iran, our lives as Iranians who live transnationally become increasingly difficult. I think it is necessary for us to make our voices heard and to oppose the strangling of our homeland. In the same way that I think voting in the US elections for the candidate who promises to prevent a war on Iran and to ease sanctions is important (in the last elections, the Green Party), I feel there is a moral imperative for Iranians abroad to participate in the Iranian elections and vote. A slight improvement is better than none.

I believe that whenever any individual has the right to vote, it is imperative for her or him to exercise that right. We can only lay a claim on the political system if we take part in it. We can only demand to know, “Where is my vote?” if we actually cast our votes and participate in the political process. Otherwise I think we are being disingenuous. The act of voting itself lays a demand upon the political system to function, and if and when it does not function and our votes are not respected, it follows that we have the right to demand our votes be respected. If you don’t vote, it is harder to legitimize the demand that your voice be heard.

Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi
Final year PhD student focusing on modern intellectual and political Iranian history, Queen's College, University of Oxford
Do you think that, beyond having the legal right, Iranians and Iranian citizens living outside Iran have the moral right to vote in Friday's presidential election despite not living in Iran?
First, I'd like to stress that I am writing in a strictly personal capacity and I am not speaking as an 'analyst' or 'expert'. I am writing as a dual-citizen, who has the right to vote, if he so chooses.

I don't feel I can determine anyone's moral rights or obligations as far as voting is concerned. Ex-pat Iranian citizens have a legal right to vote; they can choose to exercise it or not. I won't be voting, since I personally have no respect for or trust in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)'s electoral system or the regime in any way, shape or form.

Furthermore, I don't see any guarantee my vote will even be counted, or that fraud will not take place. The selection of candidates is vetted by the unelected and unaccountable Guardian Council, half of which is comprised of retrograde clerics, is truly abysmal. I also cannot envisage my vote doing anything to improve the lot of Iran's many political prisoners and prisoners of conscience.

From another angle, I see no point in voting for a pseudo-'Reformist' candidate, since anyone who might legitimately be called a 'Reformist', has been effectively marginalised, including the ex-president, Mohammad Khatami (and I should add that I seriously disagree with the latter's politics and his conception of what 'reform' entails). Hasan Rowhani is the same man who denounced protesters of Iran's last election as "seditionists" and whose cries for justice he described as "pre-planned to be abused by the enemy". Now to play up to people in the crowds he has changed his tune. Election season in Iran, much like elsewhere, causes politicians to make promises they don't plan to keep, and in any case the Iranian president's executive authority is seriously stunted, as Mahmud Ahmadinejad, much to his chagrin realised in the course of his own presidency. The theocratic elements of the Iranian constitution and Supreme Leader Khamenei's control of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), military, judiciary, Guardian Council, Intelligence Ministry etc, have little stomach for views which happen to contradict their own, as Ayatollah Khomeini's one-time darlings, the left or Reformists, have now experienced first hand.


Friday, June 7, 2013

Social Freedoms & Women’s Rights Take Center Stage in Iran’s Presidential Debate

Iran’s eight presidential candidates prepare to leave the set after their second of three televised debates in Tehran, Wednesday, June 5, 2013.
(AP Photo/IRIB, Mehdi Dehghan)

The Iranian presidential election, scheduled for June 14, is only one week away. As candidates jockey for endorsements, support and, ultimately, votes, a surprising frontrunner has emerged, according to a new university poll cited by Iranian media outlet Aftab News.

Hassan Rouhani, a former nuclear negotiator and current Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, is now leading the pack of eight candidates with 23.3%. His closest competition is Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who garnered 18.4% in the survey, while reformist Mohammad Reza Aref stood at 14.3% and principlist Saeed Jalili – once widely considered the clear favorite – at a mere 7.5%.

Rouhani, a centrist in Iranian politics, is not only close to both former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in whose administrations he served, but also a trusted representative of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s head of state. A former parliamentarian, he holds positions on both the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council and is president of the Center for Strategic Research, an establishment Iranian think tank.

At the second of three presidential debates, held on June 5 and broadcast live on state television, Rouhani condemned government censorship and restrictions on social freedoms, including women’s rights. “Let people have more freedom,” Rouhani said, “Let’s not intervene so much in their lives. Cultural issues must be solved through culture itself. Police should be the last resort.” He also condemned the confiscation of satellite dishes from apartment building roofs as an “attack against people’s privacy,” and lamented, “We have created a policed climate.”

“The solution to the country’s cultural problems is to minimize the government’s interference and allow guild associations and experts to run their own affairs,” he declared, adding, “Women work but don’t enjoy equal rights. I’ll allocate special insurance for women and will form a women affairs ministry to return their trampled rights to them.”

Aref, a former Vice President with Master’s and Doctorate degrees from Stanford University, also chimed in with similar comments. The appropriate response to “cultural aggression isn’t censorship,” he explained, “but improving the quality of local productions.”

“An unprecedented security atmosphere has been imposed in recent years that caused lack of motivation among students,” Aref said. “The solution is not confrontation, elimination or shutting down. We are living in the age of communications. The solution is producing fine cultural works.” He also addressed the issue of censorship. “We should entirely minimize the state’s role in supervising art and cultural affairs. We should seriously work in diminishing government’s role in this sphere. Art and culture should be handed over to those who make art and culture,” he insisted, concluding, “The government must be at the service of culture, not dictate it to the people.”

Meanwhile, the more conservative candidates in the race variously declared their support for such things as internet filtering and gender segregation in universities. Jalili, for instance, responded to Rouhani’s comments about women’s rights by saying, “The main role for a woman is to be a mother. If we look at mother as a full time role to raise children properly, many social ills would be erased.”

The day before, June 4, Ayatollah Khamenei himself weighed in on the upcoming vote. ”A vote for any of these eight candidates is a vote for the Islamic Republic and a vote of confidence in the system and our electoral process,” he said, before adding some words of political wisdom. “Candidates shouldn’t make impossible promises. Speak in a way that if next year at this time you listen to a recording of yourself, or people do, you won’t be ashamed,” he said, in what Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian called “an apparent reference to Ahmadinejad.”

“Make promises that you can deliver on,” Khamenei continued, “so that afterward you don’t say that ‘they didn’t let me do this’ or ‘didn’t let me do that.’”

This final week of campaigning is sure to bring more sniping and more surprises. The third and final debate, which focuses on foreign policy, will take place today, Friday June 7.

[UPDATE: Frud Bezhan and others over at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty provided extensive, blow-by-blow coverage of the debate, which they described as "lively, entertaining, and heated." Also, the intrepid Joanna Paraszczuk of EA Worldview has posted some highlights from the debate here. Wire services Reuters and Associated Press have also published preliminary debate coverage.]

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Former Muftah editor Daniel Tavana, currently a research associate at the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), has put together a comprehensive primer on the upcoming presidential election, detailing the electoral processes, candidates’ platforms, pre-election political atmosphere in Iran, as well as areas of potential concern, including the curtailing of press freedom, intimidation, and censorship.

Read his full report here.

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In other, perhaps more important news, the Iranian national soccer team defeated Qatar 1-0 in an important World Cup qualifying match on June 4. The single goal was scored by striker Rez Ghoochannejhad in the 66th minute off an assist by midfielder Mojtaba Jabari.

Highlights of the match can be seen here:



Next up, Iran plays Lebanon at Azadi Stadium in Tehran on June 11, just three days before the election. For more coverage of how soccer and politics often collide in Iran, read Holly Dagres’ recent report, published by Muftah earlier this week.

Reza Ghoochannejad, right, and Mohammad Raza celebrate at the Al-Sadd stadium in Doha on, Tuesday, June 4, 2013.
(Photo: Osama Faisal)

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Originally posted at Muftah.

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