Sunday, May 19, 2013

Outsourced Trolling, Weak Replies and More Bad Research:
Javedanfar's Former Students Unsuccessfully Defend Their Mentor


In response to a recent article I wrote addressing a number of false statements made by Israeli analyst Meir Javedanfar in an April 22 Guardian op-ed, a few comments were posted on Muftah, an online magazine for which I am an editor, and where my article was originally posted.

The comments, in general, are inane and eye-roll worthy.  Still, as they were clearly posted at the explicit urging of Mr. Javedanfar himself (rather than own up to - or somehow attempt to defend - his obvious errors), I thought they merited some sort of reply.

Below are the three comments as they appear on Muftah, followed by my reply.  Tova's comment, the third, is by far the most substantive, as it contains at least some semblance of an attempt to try to poke holes in my analysis of Javedanfar's report.  It doesn't.  Quite the contrary, in fact, it reaffirms Javedanfar's (and, apparently, his supporters') unfortunately lack of basic research skills and analytic acumen and further demonstrates how rampant falsehoods and conventional wisdom continue to proliferate when it comes to discussing Iran's nuclear program.

The three commenters, who call themselves Valerie, Ali Soltani, and Tova, are all located in Israel, namely Herzliya, where Javedanfar lectures at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), a private university.

Here they are:

  1. Valerie says:
    Meir Javedanfar is one of the most respected experts in the study of current Iranian affairs. I interviewed him and quoted his articles many times for my MA dissertation. Who is the writer of this article? has he ever spoken to Mr Javedanfar?
  2. Ali Soltani says:
    Its difficult to know whether the author is criticizing arguments or personally attacking the other person. It seems that the writer has a lot of anger issues against Javendanfar. Did they use to be friends? Very badly written.
  3. Tova says:
    I am a former student of Mr Javedanfar. I know he is busy and does not want to waste his important time on replying to articles which use the word “muck” as a description of his name. I can understand why.
    But with his permission, I will clarify the most glaring inaccuracy of this article.
    This article says that Iran had said before that it wants to make nuclear fuel.
    There is a difference between saying and doing. Iran has said many things that it has not done. The fact remains that Iran started converting 20% enriched uranium to fuel after the imposition of the EU oil sanctions. This was confirmed by the IAEA report in August 2012 which stated that Iran had recently started doing so.
    2- The writer of this article seems to have very little understanding of the difference between nuclear fuel. He says that Iran inserted fuel rods at the beginning of 2012 and because of that Mr javedanfar is wrong. Absolutely not. Mr Javedanfar clearly points to 20% enriched uranium being converted to fuel, not 3.5% which is what happened with fuel rods at the beginning of that year.
    He accuses Professor Javedanfar of ” dearth of actual insight – or basic research skills”. This is most true about the writer of this article after his failure to read Professor Javedanfar’s article properly before comparing it to “Muck”, which of course shows lack of professionalism and ad hominem attack.
    3. In another article, the writer of this article says Mr Javedanfar is lying because IAEA report which he pointed to in this Guardian article http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/29/nuclear-talks-iran-sanctions does not say Iran was working on a nuclear trigger. Mr Javedanfar clearly showed in this article http://iran-israel-observer.com/2012/12/31/refuting-richard-silverteins-accusations-against-meir-javedanfar/ that the IAEA does say that, yet the reporter has never corrected his false accusations. One has to ask why.
    Truth being a rare commodity indeed, when it comes to the writing of this shoddy “fact check” article which falsely accuses Professor Javedanfar of being a “show off” as well as other personal attacks.
    I hope Professor Javedanfar does not mind me writing this. I know he has many important lectures to give and conferences to attend to. But we as his former students will stand up against such personal attacks, shoddily covered up as “fact checking”.

This was my response:

It is delightful to see Mr. Javedanfar task his former students with defending his honor and scholarship. That they seem not to be aware of the English phrase “muck and mire” – on which the title of the article is a variation – is of no consequence. Anyone reading the piece will see that it contains no ad hominen against Mr. Javedanfar, merely a critique of his analysis based on a whole lot of fully-sourced evidence.

It should first be noted that, in none of the responses above or in Javedanfar’s own brief responses made on his Twitter account, is the veracity of the documented timeline, events described or statements quoted challenged or questioned.

Javedanfar’s primary claim that “the Iranian government had refused to even address its 20% enriched uranium process” with the P5+1 prior to the announcement of EU sanctions in January 2012 is demonstrably false. His defenders in this forum conveniently ignore this point outright, focusing instead on a more minor point presented towards the end of my article. Yet this is the central point made by Javedanfar in his Guardian analysis – that Iran is now negotiating over its 20% stockpile as a direct result of EU sanctions, thus vindicating the efficacy of the sanctions – a point which falls flat when one looks at a calendar and reads what Iranian officials had been saying for quite some time, long before the announcement of EU sanctions. On this, both Javedanfar and his acolytes are silent.

Considering this timeline cannot actually be challenged based on facts, Javedanfar's defenders like Tova (see above) skip this point all together. Rather, we see the focus turned to Javedanfar's ancillary contention that Iran only started converting some of its 20% stockpile to fuel plates after the EU announcement.

As made perfectly clear in my own analysis above, Javedanfar is employing a post-hoc ergo propter hoc argument here. Iran's intentions and technical progress had been evident for months; their publicly-declared intention was clearly to convert their 20% stockpile to plates usable in the TRR. Iranian officials had been saying as much and scientists had been working to achieve this goal for a year-and-a-half before the EU sanctions were agreed upon. The cause-and-effect claim made by Javedanfar doesn't work.

Yet, Javedanfar's defender above claims that my pointing this out constitutes "the most glaring inaccuracy" in my article simply because "[t]here is a difference between saying and doing." Unfortunately for Tova and Mr. Javedanfar, this is not much of a counter-argument as the stage had been set long before the EU sanctions announcement for this process to begin, up to and including testing the fuel conversion on 3.5 LEU before beginning the convert the 20% material.

In short, Iran wasn't just "saying" – it was also "doing"; no, not the actual conversion (I never claim as such), but the research and development, industrial installation and testing necessary to begin 20% conversion.

The IAEA confirmed in its November 8, 2011 Safeguards report (GOV/2011/65 F.33-37) that, as of mid-October of that year, Iran had continued installing "process equipment for the conversion of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8 [triuranium octoxide]" at its Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan.

In early October 2011, Iran had also informed the IAEA that it had transferred a small amount of enriched material to the R&D section of its Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) in order to "conduct research activities and pellet fabrication," for the purposes of making nuclear fuel. On 15 October 2011, the IAEA inspected the TRR and "confirmed that, on 23 August 2011, Iran had started to irradiate a prototype fuel rod..."

More importantly, the report stated, "On 22 October 2011...[the IAEA] confirmed that Iran had started to install some equipment for the fabrication of fuel for TRR [at its Fuel Manufacturing Plant in Esfahan]. During the inspection, the Agency verified five fuel plates containing natural U3O8 that had been produced at the R&D laboratory at FMP for testing purposes."

October 2011 comes before January 2012.

In this regard, my timeline and Mr. Javedanfar’s are the same; only he omits everything that happened before January 23, 2012 in his analysis of Iran’s 20% conversion progress, while I include a few years of vitally important context.

For Mr. Javedanfar to claim Iran made the decision to convert its 20% stockpile to fuel plates only after the EU announcement is an assumption conjured only to bolster his support for sanctions and is unrelated to the historical record. As the logical fallacy goes, just because the sun comes up after the rooster crows doesn't mean the rooster’s crowing caused the sun to rise.

The other point made by the above commenter relates to an issue of false attribution in another opinion piece written by Javedanfar in The Guardian and which I addressed nearly two years ago. It seems clear that Javedanfar has asked his dear defender to bring up this old news in order to discredit my own writing, which, to be honest, is kind of sad. It’s also a bad idea since he’s already officially lost that argument.

To recap, here's exactly what he wrote in The Guardian in May 2011:
Last week brought new indications that the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran want to make a nuclear bomb.
The disclosure was part of the newly released nine-page report by the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It stated that "Tehran has conducted work on a highly sophisticated nuclear triggering technology that experts said could be used for only one purpose: setting off a nuclear weapon".
As seen above, what he wrote was, "It stated…." IT STATED. But it – the "newly-released" IAEA report he refers to – didn't state that, contrary to the only meaning that sentence, especially with its inclusion of quotation marks, could possibly have in the English language. No, only The New York Times stated that in its lede. The IAEA report never mentions "experts" saying anything about anything. The report merely details the accusations inferred from forged Israeli documents that don’t stand up to scrutiny.

This is precisely the issue I brought up at the time about Javedanfar’s false attribution, which serves to lend IAEA credibility to a speculative and alarmist statement actually made by David Sanger and William Broad, whose writing on the Iranian nuclear program has long been littered with unfounded inferences and disingenuous innuendo.

But more to the point, Javedanfar didn't write, "according to The New York Times…" before quoting the paper. He explicitly wrote that the IAEA report itself came to those conclusions when it did not.

Beyond this, the allegations about the "neutron generation and associated diagnostics" (to Javedanfar is implicitly referring) had already been noted by the IAEA in its February 2011 report and therefore was not a "new indication" or a "disclosure" as he declared.

Furthermore, the nuclear triggering technology allegation had already been eviscerated by linguist George Maschke and investigative journalist Gareth Porter years earlier. The "uranium deuteride" initiator claim is taken specifically from phony documents reported upon by the Times of London in December 2009. Porter has dismantled this hoax here and here.

Unsurprisingly, the nuclear trigger claim comes from the same font of forgeries that AP reporter George Jahn relied on for his widely-mocked Evil Nuclear Graph of Doom nonsense published in November 2012.

What Javedanfar omits from his commentary is that the authenticity of such documentation has long been questioned; instead he accepts the allegations made by anonymous tipsters in the Israeli government as proven fact. This is irresponsible.

In his 2012 memoir, former IAEA Director General Mohammad ElBaradei explains, "The accuracy of these accusations has never been verified; however, it is significant that the conclusions of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate were not changed, indicating that they, at least, did not buy the ‘evidence’ put forward by Israel." (The Age of Deception, p.291)

More to the point, the above commenter suggests that Javedanfar's claims have been verified and yet, with reference to me, "the reporter has never corrected his false accusations."

This is amazing. Here, again, is the Guardian article being discussed.

Scroll down to the bottom of the article. Here, clear as day, is a correction – added by the Guardian editors earlier this year, after being appraised of my exposure of Javedanfar's false attribution – which reads in full:
This article was amended on 11 January 2013. In the original, the phrasing implied that a quotation in the second paragraph was from an IAEA report. It was actually from a New York Times article about the IAEA report.
It appears that Javedanfar's own editors found my analysis more compelling and factual than Javedanfar's rendering. The above commenter makes no mention of this. One doesn't need to wonder why.

In her conclusion, the above commenter describes my analysis of Javedanfar's recent Guardian piece as a "shoddy 'fact check' article which falsely accuses Professor Javedanfar of being a 'show off'..."

At no point does Tova challenge a single fact presented by me in the above article. Furthermore, never once in my article do I accuse Javedanfar of being a "show off" or make any suggestion to that effect (What does that even mean? What would he be showing off? His lack of factual information?), so it makes no sense that the phrase is in quotation marks.

Tova concludes by writing, "I hope Professor Javedanfar does not mind me writing this. I know he has many important lectures to give and conferences to attend to." Well, yes, Javedanfar's time must be precious enough for him to outsource a weak rebuttal to a "former student" like Tova and acolytes like "Valerie" and "Ali Soltani."

While Tova's humility is endearing, it's also phony. Why would Javedanfar "mind" her replying when her comment itself begins by admitting that she is undertaking the task of responding to my article "with his permission"?

I do hope this clears things up, Tova – and Meir. In the future, rather than pretending you haven't been caught presenting faulty information, you should probably just apologize for the error and then move on. What you've done here is kind of embarrassing.

Cheers,
NS

*****

Friday, May 17, 2013

The Newseum’s Decision to Drop Palestinian Journalists from Memorial Prompts Varied Responses


The Journalists Memorial, located in the Newseum in Washington, D.C., pays tribute to reporters, photographers and broadcasters who have died reporting the news.
(Photo Credit: Chicago Sun-Times / Newseum)


Earlier this week, Washington D.C.'s Newseum buckled to pressure applied by Israel lobby groups and omitted the names of two Palestinian news cameramen, Hussam Salama and Mahmoud al-Kumi, who were targeted last November in an Israeli air strike on Gaza the Strip, from its memorial for journalists killed in the line of duty. I wrote extensively on the hypocrisy of this decision here.

In his keynote address at the Newseum's annual rededication ceremony on Monday, NBC reporter Richard Engel supported the Newseum's decision, claiming that Salama and al-Kumi were not "strictly journalists, but political activists who worked in the media," adding, "Just because you carry a camera and a notebook doesn't make you a journalist."

Such a comment is essentially the defensive photo-negative of what Human Rights Watch Middle East director Sarah Leah Whitson said in a December 2102 report on "Unlawful Israeli Attacks on Palestinian Media."

"Just because Israel says a journalist was a fighter or a TV station was a command center does not make it so," she warned.

During his remarks, Engel also said, "Journalists shouldn't have causes. They should have principles and beliefs." He went on, however, to praise Syrian reporters "who worked for media outlets that were actively trying to topple Bashar al-Assad’s regime" and who were included, without controversy, in the museum's tribute. For Engel, the Syrian journalists (in contrast to their Palestinians counterparts who lived under Israeli occupation and were murdered by U.S.-subsidized missiles) "certainly died trying to do something noble. They were speaking out against oppression. They died trying to quench a thirst for freedom." Engel hardly seemed aware of the hypocrisy of his statements.

The Newseum has yet to answer a number of salient questions posed by The Electronic Intifada‘s Ali Abunimah about its last minute decision to excise Salama and al-Kumi from its memorial. Meanwhile, the U.S.-based Arab and Middle Eastern Journalists Association (AMEJA) has issued the following statement about the Newseum's actions.

Statement of the Arab and Middle East Journalists Association in Reference to Newseum Scandal

The Arab and Middle Eastern Journalists Association (AMEJA) condemns in the strongest possible terms, the decision of the Newseum to exclude Palestinian journalists Mahmoud al-Kumi and Hussam Salama from its memorial of journalists killed in the line of duty.

Israeli missiles fired at a car clearly marked "TV" during Israel's attack on Gaza in November, 2012, killing Messieurs Al-Kumi and Salama as they returned from covering a story for TV station Al-Aqsa at Al-Shifaa Hospital. The Newseum justifies its exclusion of the two journalists because of claims that they worked for news network run by Hamas, the governing party in Gaza. The Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders and The World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers all recognize that both Mr. Al-Kumi and Mr. Salama were legitimate journalists, and therefore entitled to all protections afforded non-combatants in times of armed conflict. Human Rights Watch, which investigated the affiliations of the two men, has determined that neither was a member of any political party, nor was either a combatant.

AMEJA wholeheartedly supports the statements of peer groups The Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders and The World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers, and is appreciative of the investigations of Human Rights Watch. However, AMEJA firmly holds that a journalist's political affiliations, whatever they might be, are irrelevant to the question of whether he or she is a journalist. Applying a political litmus test to determine whether one is a journalist is a slippery slope that serves no useful purpose in the service of an informed public.

If the Newseum truly wishes to honor the principle of press freedom, it must reverse its decision of exclusion and restore Messrs. al-Kumi and Salama from its memorial of journalists who perished while working to inform the public of vital matters of the day.

*****

Originally posted at Muftah.

*****

Monday, May 13, 2013

Buckling to Bigotry: The Newseum Dishonors Murdered Palestinian Journalists

Journalists Memorial Wall, Newseum, Washington D.C.
(Photo Credit: Fallen Soldier/Wikimedia Commons)

Just two days before Palestinians commemorate the 65th anniversary of the Nakba, the names of two Palestinian cameramen targeted and killed by Israeli air strikes in Gaza last November were dropped from a dedication ceremony held to honor "reporters, photographers and broadcasters who have died reporting the news" over the past year. The move followed an Israel lobby pressure campaign led by anti-Palestinian organizations such as the Anti-Defamation League, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the American Jewish Committee, efforts that were openly supported by the Israeli government.

The Atlantic Wire's J.K. Trotter summarizes:
Two days after Washington, D.C.'s Newseum announced its intent to honor Hussam Salama and Mahmoud al-Kumi, who were killed in November while working as cameramen for the Middle East-based Al-Aqsa TV, the well-known temple of journalism has decided — for now — not to recognize Salama and al-Kumi, citing their employer's deep ties to Hamas, a Palestinian organization currently designated by the United States as a terrorist group.
The Newseum, which honored 82 journalists on May 13, 2013, stated that it had "decided to re-evaluate their inclusion as journalists on our memorial wall pending further investigation," even though just last week, in response to the hysterical reaction to Salama's and al-Kumi's initial inclusion, the museum had affirmed and defended their decision, noting that "the Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders and The World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers all consider these men journalists killed in the line of duty."

Indeed, as Joe Catron notes on Mondoweiss, Reporters Without Borders has pointed out, "Even if the targeted media support Hamas, this does not in any way legitimize the attacks," while the Committee to Protect Journalists "found that the Israeli military's official justifications for its attacks on journalists...'did not specifically address CPJ's central question: how did Israel determine that those targeted did not deserve the civilian protections afforded to all journalists, no matter their perspective, under international law?'"

The World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers includes both Salama and al-Kumi on its list of "69 Media Employees Killed in 2012," as does the International Federation of Journalists in its report, "In the Grip of Violence: Journalists and Media staff Killed in 2012."

Human Rights Watch, in its December 20, 2012 report on "Unlawful Israeli Attacks on Palestinian Media," concluded,
Four Israeli attacks on journalists and media facilities in Gaza during the November 2012 fighting violated the laws of war by targeting civilians and civilian objects that were making no apparent contribution to Palestinian military operations.
The attacks killed two Palestinian cameramen, wounded at least 10 media workers, and badly damaged four media offices, as well as the offices of four private companies. One of the attacks killed a two-year-old boy who lived across the street from a targeted building.
The Israeli government asserted that each of the four attacks was on a legitimate military target but provided no specific information to support its claims. After examining the attack sites and interviewing witnesses, Human Rights Watch found no indications that these targets were valid military objectives.
“Just because Israel says a journalist was a fighter or a TV station was a command center does not make it so,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Journalists who praise Hamas and TV stations that applaud attacks on Israel may be propagandists, but that does not make them legitimate targets under the laws of war.”
HRW added, "The two men’s families, interviewed separately, said the men were neither participating in the fighting nor members of any armed group. Human Rights Watch found no evidence, including during visits to the men’s homes, to contradict that claim. Hamas’s armed wing, al-Qassam Brigades, has not put either man on its official list of killed fighters – an unlikely omission if the men had been playing a military role."

For the Newseum to be bullied into omitting Salama and al-Kumi from its rededication ceremony by avowedly Zionist groups and right-wing media outlets demonstrates that the institution itself is no less a propaganda outfit than Al-Aqsa TV. This shameful last minute decision effectively grants the U.S. and Israeli governments the ability to decide who is and who is not a journalist and who should and who should not be honored for their work.

But the decision also reeks of hypocrisy and Manichean double standards.

The Newseum is essentially suggesting that sycophantic journalists parroting government propaganda may be legitimate targets in military operations and should be labeled combatants, rather than civilians who enjoy press freedoms and are subject to protection.

Yet this only extends as far as the U.S. State Department says it does.

The ADL's Abe Foxman called Salama and al-Kumi "members of a terrorist organization advancing their agenda through murderous violence" and "terrorist operatives" who "were working for a propaganda outlet, not a legitimate news organization." The AJC's David Harris echoed these sentiments, labeling Salama and al-Kumi as "brazen terrorists" and "two individuals who were integral to the propaganda machine of the Hamas terrorist organization," that could not be considered "a legitimate media operation."

Such terms as "terrorism" and "terrorist" are perhaps the most loaded, politicized, exploited and, consequently, meaningless words in our current lexicon, employed as a bludgeon against critical thinking in order to reinforce "us vs. them" narratives.

Apparently, the Newseum has determined that our propaganda deserves respect and admiration, while their propaganda (in this case, documenting on camera the effects Israeli bombs and missiles have on the human flesh of Palestinian people at Gaza's al-Shifa Hospital) should be condemned, targeted and investigated.

By this measure, plenty of alleged propagandists grace the memorial wall of the Newseum already, with more added during Monday's ceremony.

Mohamed Al-Massalma, a freelance reporter for Al Jazeera, was killed by a sniper while covering the Syrian civil war in Busra Al-Harir in late January 2013. The Syrian journalist, working under the pseudonym Mohamed Al-Horani, was "an activist in the revolt against President Bashar al-Assad," before joining Al Jazeera.

In January 2012, Mukarram Khan Aatif was gunned down in the Pakistani town of Shabqadar by members of the Pakistani Taliban. Aatif was a journalist working for Deewa Radio, the U.S. government's Voice of America Pasto-language service. He was among those honored by the Newseum this year.

The taxpayer-funded Voice of America (VOA) and its affiliated services have been legally banned from broadcasting or distribution here in the United States for the past 65 years because of a Congressional act prohibiting the government from propagandizing to its own citizens. Only last year was this law reversed; the ban will be officially lifted this coming July 2013. VOA is literally U.S. government propaganda, yet its reporters are accorded due protection from violence, as they should be.

Another VOA journalist, Mohammed Ali Nuxurkey, was killed in an al-Shabab bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia, this past March There is no doubt he will be added the Newseum's wall next year.

If any distinctions are to be made among different categories of journalists caught in the line of fire or deliberately targeted for murder, international law does not, in fact, favor the Foxman's and Harris' of the world.

While war journalists who are not embedded with troops or themselves soldiers taking direct part in hostilities are legally protected by the law of armed conflict, embedded reporters are not necessarily similarly protected.

According to international law professor Sandesh Sivakumaran, writing for the Oxford University Press, embedded journalists, while civilians, may be "casualties of lawful attacks" as "[t]he law allows for the targeting of troops and that targeting may result in bystanders or embedded reporters becoming casualties."

Still, embedded journalists who were killed while accompanying American occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan - a policy promoted by the U.S. military in order to ensure positive reporting on American actions (some might call that propaganda) - have also rightly been accorded a place in the Newseum's memorial. Journalists like Spanish reporter Julio Anguita Parrado and German correspondent Christian Liebig, killed by Iraqi missiles in an April 7, 2003 attack on the U.S. Army's 3rd Division headquarters in Baghdad, are honored by the Newseum as is NBC News soundman Jeremy Little, killed in Fallujah in July 2003 while embedded with the Army's 3rd Infantry.

Sivakumaran also explains that "[j]ournalists who work for media outlets or information services of the armed forces" are legally considered "members of the armed forces," and therefore "don’t benefit from the protections afforded to civilians and their deaths don’t constitute a violation of the law."

As such, the Newseum's glaring duplicity is all the more evident when considering the case of James P. Hunter. A staff sergeant, reporter and photographer with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, Hunter was killed on June 18, 2010 by an IED while covering the massive U.S. offensive taking place in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for The Fort Campbell Courier, an Army newspaper in Kentucky. He was an active duty soldier and the first Army journalist to die in combat since 9/11. Still, the Newseum saw fit to honor Hunter on its memorial wall.

Yet in the case of Salama and al-Kumi, "Israeli officials sought to justify attacks on Palestinian media by saying the military had targeted individuals or facilities that 'had relevance to' or were 'linked with' a Palestinian armed group, or had 'encouraged and lauded acts of terror against Israeli civilians,'" according to Human Rights Watch. "These justifications, suggesting that it is permissible to attack media because of their associations or opinions, however repugnant, rather than their direct participation in hostilities, violate the laws of war and place journalists at grave risk."

If repellent statements, including the justification of and praise for acts of violence against civilians, are the benchmark of propaganda and thereby constitute legitimate targeting for death by those opposed to such statements, then countless American journalists and commentators from across the political spectrum would be subject to the same fate as Salama and al-Kumi.

Warmongering and incitement abound in the editorial pages of The Washington Post and Wall Street Journal. Liberal commentators like Joe Klein and former White House spokesman Robert Gibbs exalt the extrajudicial executions by flying robot of countless civilians, including a 16-year-old American citizen in Yemen and hundreds of children in Pakistan. Right-wing pundits like Jennifer Rubin and her friends at Commentary and The Weekly Standard openly advocate for the murder of Iranian and Palestinian civilians, endlessly call for permanent war and occupation, support torture and indefinite detention, advocate for the assassination of whistleblowers, scientists and foreign officials, and justify the war crimes of their preferred military forces and governments.

Just days before the car in which Salama and al-Kumi were traveling, marked clearly as a press vehicle, was blown up by an Israeli bomb, Rubin published a post praising the IDF assault on Gaza. Hardly able to contain her glee, Rubin anonymously quoted "an old Middle East hand" declaring that, after weeks of sporadic Israeli air strikes ("a form of messaging to Hamas"), "the Israelis escalated. But still they are avoiding infrastructure, hitting pinpoint high-level Hamas target."

A recent B'Tselem report on Israel's actions last November, however, "challenges the common perception in the Israeli public and media that the operation was 'surgical' and caused practically no fatalities among uninvolved Palestinian civilians," noting that, "in some cases at least, the [Israeli] military violated IHL [international humanitarian law] and in other cases there are substantial reasons to believe IHL was violated." Israeli air strikes killed 167 Palestinians in Gaza, at least 87 of whom were noncombatants, including 31 minors.

Two days after cheering Israeli war crimes, Rubin set her sights on a bigger target. "Israel can keep swatting down Hamas, using air power or, if need be, going into Gaza on land," she wrote. "It has a solemn obligation to defend itself against what was a deliberate escalation by Hamas in the number and quality of weapons launched against Israel's civilian population. But even with the most robust U.S. support this is not a long-term solution. That will only come when Iran is dealt with, either militarily or via regime change."

Anyone arguing that Rubin could be targeted with violence for writing her opinions would be labeled sociopathic and lambasted for incitement, and for good reason. And there is no doubt that if correspondents from Israeli Army Radio or employees of the state-run Israel Broadcasting Authority were killed, they would be honored by the Newseum, without so much as a whiff of dissent, let alone outrage.

It is evident that, as always, Palestinians are subject to unparalleled scrutiny and suspicion due to the tireless defamation and lobbying efforts of big-moneyed Zionist organizations and ideological zealots.

But is it surprising that the Newseum should jump on this bias bandwagon?

In the late 1940's, Bugsy Siegel's former publicist Hank Greenspun was recruited by Jewish militias in Palestine to help them fight against both the occupying British and indigenous Palestinians. He hijacked a yacht and laundered $1.3 million through Mexico in order to smuggle machine guns stolen from the U.S. Navy in Hawaii to the prolific terrorist group Irgun, which had blown up Jerusalem's King David Hotel the year before and would massacre the residents of Deir Yassin a year later. Soon thereafter, Greenspun was apprehended by the FBI while attempting to illegally ship surplus combat airplane engines to Haganah.

In 1950, he was convicted of violating the U.S. Neutrality Act and fined $10,000 for his arms deals. The same year, he purchased the Las Vegas Review-Journal and renamed it the Las Vegas Sun, serving as publisher for the next four decades.

Upon his death in 1989, former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres called Greenspun "a hero of our country and a fighter for freedom - a man of great spirit who fought with his mind and his soul; a man of great conviction and commitment." In 1993, a one-acre plaza in the Jerusalem Botanical Garden of Hebrew University was dedicated to him.

In 2006, the Greenspun Family donated $7 million to the Newseum.  The museum, which describes Greenspun as a "crusader for justice," named a terrace in his honor. It overlooks Pennsylvania Avenue.

*****

Friday, May 10, 2013

In Iranian Town, Recycled Stones Make For Groundbreaking Architecture

(Photo Credit: Omid Khodapanahi / AbCT)

The ancient town of Mahallat in central Iran, located roughly halfway between Tehran and Esfahan, boasts Hellenistic ruins from the time of Alexander the Great, Zoroastrian fire temples, castles, caravansaries, lush gardens, mountain caves, and curative and therapeutic hot springs. It’s also home to one of the most modern, innovative, sustainable, eco-friendly and cool-looking apartment buildings in the country, if not the entire region.

The primary driver of the Mahallat economy is the mining of travertine, a type of limestone deposited by mineral springs that has been used as building material since the Roman era (the Colloseum is constructed mostly of travertine). Because of the inefficiency of stone-cutting technology, the manufacturing of travertine tiles produces over 50% of excess waste. This means that less than half of the mined material is actually used in the final product. The incredible amount of unused and discarded stones contributes to the pollution of the natural environment.

In 2007, architect Ramin Mehdizadeh, a native of Mahallat, along with the team at the Tehran-based Architecture by Collective Terrain (AbCT) designed an extraordinary building in Mehdizadeh’s hometown, exploiting these discarded raw materials to their fullest economic and environmental potential. Dubbed “Apartment No. 1,” both the building’s exterior and interior walls are made of recycled travertine stones. “In doing so,” the architects explain, “we demonstrate how an architectural solution can help us preserve precious natural resources in a creative way, and significantly reduce the cost.”

As described by Inhabitat.com, “The five-story project features retail on the first floor and four stories of apartments. Each floor has two 3-bedroom apartments, and the local stone used on the exterior is also brought into the interior to create a unified theme.”

The designers themselves note:
The recycled stones used for the exterior create a subtle effect on geometry of the project, which consist of façade with emphatic angles. Slight roughness of mixed recycled stones creates somewhat warmer texture, effectively complementing sharply tailored façade. As a result, the project, which speaks the language of modern architecture, uniquely blends with verdant trees and surroundings of Mahallat, an old town, which has seen more than a thousand year of history. Such coherent theme of locally-recycled stones is also reverberated in the interior of the project, where simple structure is accentuated by stone walls, creating a space that is expressed in a natural yet intimate manner.
The 1,300-square-meter building is built to conserve energy. “The stones provide thermal mass to slow the transfer of heat throughout the day, and operable shading devices help control sunlight and heat gain,” as detailed by Inhabitat.com. Large locally milled wooden shutters cover the building's floor-ceiling-windows. ”When the shades are open during the winter, more light and heat reaches into the interior. In the hot summer months, the shades can be closed to keep the sun out. Angled facades near windows help control the amount of daylight that enters the interior.”

Construction of "Apartment No. 1" began in 2008 and was completed in 2010. That year, it took first prize for residential structures at Iran’s Memar Awards. In 2013, the project was shortlisted for an Aga Khan Award for Architecture. The building has already influenced local builders and masons to begin utilizing recycled travertine in their own constructions.

More photos by AbCT associate Omid Khodapanahi and a short film about the project after the jump.

Wednesday, May 8, 2013

Muck & Meir: Prolific Analyst Botches Facts to Vindicate Failed Iran Sanctions Policy

Tehran Research Reactor
(Photo Credit: AFP Photo / Iranian Presidency)


“Comment is free, but facts are sacred.”
- C.P. Scott, editor of the Guardian, 1921


Israeli commentator Meir Javedanfar has made a very successful career of trafficking conventional wisdom and mainstream narratives about Iran’s nuclear program.

In a recent op-ed for the Guardian newspaper he has insisted – as he has done for years now – that the economic warfare and collective punishment exacted upon Iran at the behest of the United States and Israel is a beneficial policy that has made the Iranian government more malleable and amenable to Western diktat over its uranium enrichment program.

A recent spate of informed analysis and reports from establishment institutions has acknowledged the failure of sanctions to bully Iran into capitulating to illegal and hypocritical Western demands. New studies have also found that the Iranian economy has nimbly adapted to the restrictions imposed by sanctions, offering more production, growth and diversification than may have been possible without them.

Refusing to bow to such credible research, Mr. Javedanfar has held fast to the perspective that “sanctions have proved themselves to be effective” in forcing Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to reenter negotiations and consider curbing Iran’s nuclear program.

In his op-ed, Javedanfar highlights a sequence of events over the past few years to show that Iran’s decisions to engage in talks have been directly influenced by embargoes on Iranian oil and gas, which have hurt the Islamic Republic’s economy.

But the facts simply don’t work in Mr. Javedanfar’s favor.

Iran’s decisions on both enriching uranium to roughly 20% and the fate of its accumulating stockpile form the centerpiece of his commentary. Javedanfar writes that, “in 2010 and 2011, the Iranian negotiations team refused to even address confidence-building proposals made by the P5+1… But things changed after the EU announcement on 23 January 2012 that it will impose an oil embargo against Iran this July [sic],” at which point Mr. Javedanfar says Iran began to entertain “proposals and suggestions from the P5+1.”

Javedanfar claims that, in September 2012, Iran finally “offered to suspend uranium enrichment at 20% ’if the west lifts sanctions against Tehran.’” He presents this proposal as “a breakthrough, as prior to the EU oil sanctions announcement, the Iranian government had refused to even address its 20% enriched uranium process.”

Read that last sentence once more, before we continue. Please. Ok, one more time. Now remember it.

Mr. Javedanfar notes that “Iran started producing 20% enriched uranium in February 2010,” yet conveniently omits why Iran made the decision to do so in the first place.

Let’s review the history Javedanfar doesn’t disclose.

The P5+1 Negotiations – a Comedy of American Recalcitrance

Uranium enriched to nearly 20% – a higher threshold than needed to fuel nuclear power plants, but far below that which is needed to manufacture a nuclear weapon – was necessary to keep the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) producing medical radioisotopes used to treat nearly a million Iranian cancer patients.

In advance of the depletion of its reactor fuel, Iran tried to purchase more enriched uranium on the open market under full IAEA supervision.

Writing in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, nuclear experts Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich have reminded us that in 2009 the Iranian government “warned that it will start producing 20 percent enriched uranium unless a deal to purchase the material is struck with the United States, France, and Russia. In June 2009, Iran approached the IAEA with a request to seek vendors for fresh fuel.”

In late September 2009, in advance of renewed nuclear talks with the P5+1 in Geneva, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad informed Newsweek that “nuclear materials we are seeking to purchase are for medicinal purposes” and that Iran “would pay money for the material.”

He continued,
We have in the past bought the 20% enriched uranium from other countries—not from the United States. Now we could buy it from the United States. I think it is a good place to start for cooperating and talking. It is an issue that is humanitarian—it is about medicine.
Nevertheless, during the Geneva talks in early October 2009, the United States and its European partners prevented any discussion of a commercial sale. Instead, they offered a “swap” proposal whereby Iran would ship out most of its stockpiled low-enriched uranium to Russia to be enriched to 19.75%. This would then be shipped to France where fuel rods that could power the TRR would be produced.

Iran agreed in principle to this arrangement, with the intention of hammering out mutually acceptable and beneficial details at a later date.

At the time, Ali Shirzadian, a spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), told the Iranian press, “Iran fully owns the enrichment technology and therefore it will sit at the negotiating table with power.” Were follow-up talks to fall apart, Shirzadian explained that Iran would officially announce to the IAEA “that Iran would act on its own to supply the fuel for the Tehran reactor.”

By early December 2009, the deal was still in the works. Iran’s then-Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki reiterated that Iran was “willing to exchange most of its uranium for processed nuclear fuel from abroad” in a phased transfer of material with full guarantees that the West “will not backtrack an exchange deal.”

In reviewing the P5+1 offer, the Iranian press reported, “technical studies showed that it would only take two to three months for any country to further enrich the nuclear stockpile and turn it into metal nuclear rods for the Tehran Research Reactor, while suppliers had announced that they would not return fuel to Iran any less than seven months.”

As the parties’ discussed final terms, Mottaki suggested Iran initially hand over a quarter of its enriched uranium stockpile in a simultaneous exchange for an equivalent amount of processed fuel for use in the medical research reactor. The remainder of the uranium would then be traded over “several years,” under an agreed upon and internationally supervised framework.

This proposed timetable was immediately rejected by Western powers. An unidentified senior U.S. official was quoted by the Voice of America as claiming that the Iranian counter-proposal was inconsistent with the “fair and balanced” draft agreement.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the Islamic Republic to “accept the agreement as proposed because we are not altering it.” Such is the nature of Western negotiations with Iran: ultimatums, not diplomacy.

As former IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei told Der Spiegel after leaving the agency, “the Americans and the Europeans…weren’t interested in a compromise with the government in Tehran, but regime change — by any means necessary.”

Once any chance of a negotiated solution had been scuttled by the United States’ refusal to act in good faith, Iran pressed forward with its plan to domestically produce the needed fuel.

In his recent Guardian article, Mr. Javedanfar states that Iran had no reason to enrich to the 20% level since there had been “repeated proposals by the P5+1 to do this abroad as part of a swap deal.” His claim clearly contradicts the historical record on the parties’ negotiations.

Contrary to what Javedanfar would have his readers believe, the reason Iran began enriching uranium to 20% in February 2010 (under the full supervision of the IAEA) was due to U.S. recalcitrance. Still, that very month, then-AEOI Director Ali Akbar Salehi expressed hope that a deal could be struck.

“We have the capability to enrich uranium to any percentage we wish, but we asked the [International Atomic Energy] Agency to ask other countries that could supply the 20-percent [enriched uranium] because we did not want to go beyond five percent. But they did not respond,” Salehi told Iran’s PressTV in a live interview on February 9, 2010. “All we have asked the West or countries that have the capacity to produce the fuel is ‘Please supply us with the fuel,’” he said.

“So the deal is still on the table. If they come forward and supply the fuel, then we will stop the 20-percent enrichment,” Salehi added. Such a development was deemed ”wholly unjustified” by P5+1 officials.

A month later, having received no positive response from the United States and its partners and amid talk of additional Western sanctions on Iran, Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh, Iran’s envoy to the IAEA, “warned that sanctions would prompt his country to reject the uranium exchange deal, and called on the West to carry out the deal as proposed by Iran, namely to perform the exchange on Iranian soil,” according to a report in the Iranian media.

Iran’s Continued Willingness to Stop Higher Enrichment

Throughout 2010 and 2011, the UN Security Council levied another round of sanctions, a deal struck by Brazil and Turkey with Iran was rejected by the United States, and threats of military action against Iran continued unabated. Iranian officials were, however, still talking of halting their 20% enrichment activities.

In late July 2010, The Wall Street Journal reported, “Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said his Iranian counterpart, Manouchehr Mottaki, had pledged on Sunday to stop enriching uranium to the higher grade needed for a medical-research reactor, provided that world powers agree to a fuel-swap deal Tehran outlined in May with Turkey and Brazil.”

A month later, Ahmadinejad told the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, “We promise to stop enriching uranium to 20% purity if we are ensured fuel supply.”

In September 2010, Ahmadinejad restated Iran’s position. “We were not interested to carry out 20% enrichment,” he said. “They [the U.S. and its allies] politicized the issue. We were forced to do it to support the [cancer] patients.”

“We will consider halting uranium enrichment whenever nuclear fuel is provided to us,” Ahmadinejad told the Associated Press.

A year later, Ahmadinejad was still reiterating this proposal.

On September 13, 2011, he told The Washington Post, ”For power stations, we need uranium of 3.5%, and we are producing that fuel. For the Tehran reactor, we need uranium grade of 20%, and we are producing that. We have no other requirements. Of course, at the beginning we had no interest to produce uranium grade 20%. But the West refrained from giving us that uranium, so we had to start producing uranium grade 20%.” He added:
If they give us the 20% enriched uranium this very week, we will cease the domestic enrichment of uranium of up to 20% this very week…We don’t want to produce uranium of 20%. Because they did not give us that uranium, we had to make our own investments. If they start to give us that uranium today, we will stop production… If they give us uranium grade 20%, we would stop production… I repeat: If you give us uranium grade 20% now, we will stop production. Because uranium grade 20% can only be used for such reactors, nothing else.
Over the next few weeks, Ahmadinejad repeated this offer in other international and Iranian media outlets.

So much for the Iranian government refusing “to even address its 20% enriched uranium process” prior to 2012.

Questionable Claims about Iran’s Decision to Convert Its Stockpile

What else does Javedanfar claim? That “sanctions have also affected Iran’s decision-making about its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium.” What’s his evidence? That Iran has been converting its 20% enriched uranium to nuclear reactor fuel plates, thus precluding the further enrichment of such material to weapons grade level and thereby reducing the proliferation risk posed by Iran’s 20% stockpile.

He writes, “The fact that Iran started doing this after the announcement of the EU oil sanctions in January 2012 is another indication that sanctions have affected its nuclear strategy. A strategy that shows sensitivity to pressure.”

Time to check the calendar again. As usual, what Mr. Javedanfar excludes from his analysis is just as important as what he chooses to include. In truth, Iran had already made the decision to convert portions of its 20% stockpile to fuel plates before the E.U. embargo was agreed upon and unveiled.

In mid-July 2010, AEOI chief Ali Akbar Salehi revealed Iran’s goal of manufacturing domestically produced reactor fuel by September 2011. “At present we have produced about 20 kg of 20%-enriched uranium and we are now producing fuel plates,” he told reporters.

After experiencing technical setbacks, on October 17, 2011, Salehi, now Iran’s Foreign Minister, announced “plans to produce the first of its [Iran’s] own enriched nuclear fuel within five months,” AFP reported, adding, ”He said the plate, made of uranium enriched to 20 percent, would be tested at Tehran’s research reactor.”

By mid-December 2011, Salehi issued an update. “Within the next two months the first fuel plate which is produced with the 20 percent enriched uranium will be placed in Tehran’s research reactor.”

Shortly thereafter, in early January 2012, international media (including the Guardian itself) reported the Iranian government’s announcement that it had “successfully produced and tested fuel rods,” made presumably from 3.5% enriched uranium, in the reactor core of the TRR. In response, Peter Crail of the Arms Control Association assured the press, “The (fuel rod) development itself doesn’t put them any closer to producing weapons.”

On January 9, 2012, under the supervision and seal of the IAEA, Iran began enriching uranium to 20% at its Fordo facility.

Two weeks after that, on January 23, 2012, the European Union announced the oil embargo.

Iranian decision-making was unaltered by this announcement, as its enrichment and conversion efforts progressed unabated. By the middle of the next month, Iran was loading domestically-produced fuel plates in the Tehran Research Reactor. By June 2012, Iran had successfully converted about one-third of its 20% stockpile to fuel plates. It has continued this process ever since, while continuing to offer suspending its 20% enrichment if the right conditions are met.

Meanwhile, European courts have been striking down the very banking sanctions praised by Javedanfar as illegal and Iran’s impressive scientific and technological progress expose both the impotence and futility of the U.S.-led sanctions effort.

Conclusion

Apparently, Mr. Javedanfar is well-versed in the employment of the logical fallacy post-hoc ergo propter hoc; that is, arguing that “because event Y occurred after event X, therefore X caused Y.” Similar claims were made last month by the editorial board of The Washington Post, crediting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with scaring the Iranians into reducing their stockpile with the flick of a red magic marker. Matt Duss, policy analyst at the Center for American Progress, efficiently debunked this nonsense.

Now, Javedanfar has attempted to resuscitate the claim by setting the catalyzing event (the approval of E.U. sanctions, rather than Netanyahu’s pen and cartoon bomb charade) back nine months. He just didn’t go far enough. If he had, he might have noted that the Iranians have been open to negotiation over its nuclear program, as well as repairing U.S.-Iranian relations, for a decade now.

Javedanfar’s dearth of actual insight – or basic research skills – demonstrates his unshakeable fealty to mainstream, often Washington and Tel Aviv-driven, talking points and continued support for a meaningless sanctions regime that has done nothing but increase the chance of armed conflict and cause a great deal of suffering for the Iranian people.

If Javedanfar truly believes sanctions are sound policy, vindicated by yielding what he deems to be positive results, he is certainly entitled to his own opinions. Pontification on causation is surely what political commentators get paid to do. What cannot be manipulated, however, are basic facts or the sequence of events.

Mr. Javedanfar describes himself as “the most frequently quoted Israeli expert on Iranian affairs in the international press” and boasts about being “interviewed and quoted numerous times a week in different publications.”

With such prolific false analysis, it is no surprise truth is a rare commodity when it comes to media coverage of Iran’s nuclear program.

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Originally posted at Muftah.

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Monday, May 6, 2013

The Tweet Is On!

This little tweet of mine, from a couple days ago, was mentioned by both Glenn Greenwald and Andrew Sullivan today in their respective posts about the recent Israeli airstrikes in Damascus.

Click below to read the posts; both are highly recommended.

Israeli bombing of Syria and moral relativism

The Guardian
May 6, 2013

Intervene In Syria? Just Say No.

The Dish
May 6, 2013

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Friday, May 3, 2013

New Study Examines Media Coverage of Iranian Nuclear Program


Late last month, The University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies (CISSM) released an extensive new report examining the mainstream media's coverage of the Iranian nuclear program and its attendant developments and implications over the past four years.

The study, entitled "The Media & Iran’s Nuclear Program: An analysis of U.S. and U.K. coverage, 2009-2012" [PDF] and authored by CISSM Project Manager Jonas Siegel and Saranaz Barforoush, a Ph.D. student at the Philip Merrill College of Journalism at the University of Maryland, analyzes over 1,200 articles, editorials and opinion commentary pieces published in six leading, well-respected and influential English-language news outlets over the course of four three-week time periods between 2009 and 2012.

Drawing direct parallels to the irresponsible, inadequate, inaccurate and dangerously ideological media malpractice during the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the CISSM report concludes that press coverage of the Iranian nuclear program has been – and continues to be – similarly distorted and dishonest, confusing and contradictory.

Among other numerous findings, it demonstrates that misinformation is a hallmark of Iran-focused journalism and analysis, which rely heavily on statements made by Western and Israeli politicians and government spokespeople and establish false choices for how to resolve the current conflict. "Newspaper coverage generally adopted the tendency of U.S., European, and Israeli officials to place on Iran the burden to resolve the dispute over its nuclear program, failing to acknowledge the roles of these other countries in the dispute," the report says.

As a result, coverage "reflected and reinforced the negative sentiments about Iran that are broadly shared by U.S., European, and Israeli publics."

At a recent presentation and panel discussion on the study held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C., co-author Jonas Siegal pointed out "that newspaper coverage in the last four years has emphasized the policy prescriptions and narratives put forth by government officials while deemphasizing other voices and alternative policy approaches that could be used to resolve the dispute, such as that of international organizations like the IAEA."

Other panelists included NIAC's Research Director Reza Marashi, University of Maryland's Director of the International Center for Media and the Public Agenda Susan Moeller, and veteran Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus. While Marashi and Moeller both concurred with the report's findings, such as the media's unfortunate tendency to promote the "'he said/she said' aspects of the policy debate, without adequately explaining the fundamental issues that should have been informing assessments," Pincus was less worried. "It is not the responsibility of the journalist to provide comprehensive coverage every time on every subject," he insisted, "instead, it is the obligation of the reader to explore these issues in greater depth and draw their own conclusions."

Such a remark is troubling, especially from Pincus. In Bill Moyers' 2007 PBS documentary, "Buying the War" – a searing indictment of the media's role as war cheerleader for the Bush administration – Pincus himself laments on camera, "More and more the media become, I think, common carriers of administration statements and critics of the administration. We've sort of given up being independent on our own." In essence, our current media are merely willing stenographers, uncritically amplifying talking points for mass consumption.

Sadly, it is clear that Pincus, along with many of his colleagues in the mainstream media, seem to have abdicated their role and responsibility as a reliable check on power and propaganda and, perhaps worse, learned nothing from the past ten years, now even ignoring the rampant failures they themselves once acknowledged had catastrophic consequences.

Below is the report's Executive Summary. The read the full report can be accessed here.


"Media Coverage of Iran’s Nuclear Program"

by Jonas Siegel and Saranaz Barforoush

CISSM Report dated April 2013

The manner in which news media frame their coverage of Iran’s nuclear program is critically important to public understanding and to policy decisions that will determine whether the dispute can be resolved without war. News coverage of the lead-up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and of the justifications of that invasion was found to have had a profound, distorting effect on public understanding and the decision to go to war. Is news media coverage having a similar effect on U.S. and international discussions about Iran’s nuclear program? If so, how exactly is the framing of the dispute and the broader approach of news media to covering this issue affecting the choices available to policy makers? And how is coverage likely to affect the dispute’s outcome?

To answer these and other questions, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) analyzed a sample of the newspaper coverage from six influential, English-language newspapers—the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Financial Times, the Guardian, and the Independent—published during the past four years. By focusing on time periods in which significant events in the timeline of Iran’s nuclear program and the international response to it took place, this study identified several patterns in newspaper coverage. The study found that:

• Newspaper coverage focused on the “he said/she said” aspects of the policy debate, without adequately explaining the fundamental issues that should have been informing assessments—such as Iran’s nuclear capabilities and intentions, the influence of U.S., European, Iranian, and Israeli security strategies, and the impact of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

• When newspaper coverage did address Iranian nuclear intentions and capabilities, it did so in a manner that lacked precision, was inconsistent over time, and failed to provide adequate sourcing and context for claims. This led to an inaccurate picture of the choices facing policy makers.

• Government officials, particularly U.S. government officials, were the most frequently quoted or relied-on sources in coverage of Iran’s nuclear program. This tendency focused attention on a narrow set of policy options and deemphasized other potential approaches to the dispute.

• Newspaper coverage generally adopted the tendency of U.S., European, and Israeli officials to place on Iran the burden to resolve the dispute over its nuclear program, failing to acknowledge the roles of these other countries in the dispute.

• A plurality of newspaper articles took the approach of examining the domestic political and international diplomatic angles of the larger story, contributing to the heavy reliance on official sources and a focus on official policy proscriptions. Commentary and opinion articles relating to Iran’s nuclear program made up a larger than typical share of the coverage, demonstrating the intense interest focused on the topic and opening the public debate to a range of viewpoints.

• Newspaper coverage paid insufficient attention to the broader context—particularly, the security concerns of the United States, Iran, Israel, and European states, and the effect of domestic politics within these same countries—that influences what specific actors say or do about Iran’s nuclear program at different times. This obscured the substantial confusion about national motivations and made it difficult to conceive of and debate consensual solutions to the dispute.

• Coverage of Iran’s nuclear program reflected and reinforced the negative sentiments about Iran that are broadly shared by U.S., European, and Israeli publics. This contributed to misunderstandings about the interests involved and narrowed the range of acceptable outcomes.

In general, these characteristics led newspapers to frame their coverage of Iran’s nuclear program in a manner that emphasized official narratives of the dispute and a relatively narrow range of policy choices available to officials. By not consistently describing the complex web of international relationships, security concerns, and intervening political factors in sufficient detail, newspaper coverage further privileged official narratives and policy preferences. This makes it likely that the policies enacted and under consideration by policy makers—coercive diplomacy and war—remain the most likely outcome of the dispute. In this way, news coverage of Iran’s nuclear program is reminiscent of news coverage of the run-up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. News coverage has the potential to play a significant, constructive role in finding a lasting resolution to the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program, but journalists and editors first need to address the tendencies present in their current coverage of the topic.

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Originally posted at Muftah.

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